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Article
What Is Race?: The New Constitutional Politics of 
Affirmative Action
MARY ZIEGLER
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas II defied 
expectations, upholding an affirmative-action program and opening the door for 
universities to adopt similar policies. Using original historical research, this Article 
contends that Fisher II matters just as much because of the new challenges it reveals for 
proponents of affirmative action. Read together with the Court’s recent decision in 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, the dissents in Fisher II lay bare 
profound dangers confronting proponents of affirmative action, regardless of the 
outcome in Fisher II. In addition to praising colorblindness, the Court has cast doubt on 
the very definition of race. 
In the past, activists consistently used race to describe the color of one’s skin, but 
before Schuette, the meaning of race itself had not played a central part in challenges 
to the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action. As Schuette shows, anti-
affirmative-action amici and activists have developed a new argument: a claim that if 
race is a social construct, race-conscious remedies are arbitrary, unfair, and likely to 
reinforce existing stereotypes. Shaping the Schuette majority, this argument took center 
stage in Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Fisher II. Future challenges to affirmative 
action will center on the meaning (and incoherence) of racial categories. 
As the new anti-affirmative-action activism makes plain, the question is how courts 
can address racial discrimination when racial identities themselves are fluid and 
complex. The Article looks to employment discrimination law—and to “regarded-as” 
liability—as a framework for judges seeking to address the reality of race discrimination 
without reifying racial categories. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and 
the Americans with Disability Act Amendments Act of 2009 (ADAAA), a worker may in 
certain cases seek relief when she is regarded as disabled—regardless of whether she 
actually belongs to a protected class. The Article argues that regarded-as reasoning has 
considerable potential in the context of postsecondary admissions. In complying with 
existing Fourteenth-Amendment jurisprudence, admissions officers already rely on 
proxies for applicants’ race. Doing so checks self-serving behavior and better captures 
the fluidity of race in modern America.
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Fisher v. University of Texas II 
defied expectations, upholding an affirmative-action program and opening 
the door for universities to adopt similar policies.1 Because of the result in 
Fisher II, commentators have mostly focused on the potential Fisher II holds 
out for universities interested in increasing racial diversity.2 Using original 
historical research, this Article contends that Fisher II matters just as much 
because of the new challenges it reveals for proponents of affirmative action. 
Read together with the Court’s recent decision in Schuette v. Coalition to 
                                                                                                                         
* Mary Ziegler is the Stearns Weaver Miller Professor at Florida State University College of Law. 
She would like to thank Jake Linford, Wayne Logan, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Logan Sawyer, Franita 
Tolson, and Anders Walker for agreeing to share their thoughts on earlier drafts of this piece.
1 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207 (2016) (holding that the university’s 
use of race as part of an affirmative-action admissions program did not violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment).
2 For a sample of the response to Fisher, see, for example, Elise Boddie, Symposium: The Beneficial 
Purposes of Race, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 4:21 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/
06/symposium-the-beneficial-purposes-of-race/ [https://perma.cc/RD6Z-P87P] (discussing the benefits 
of “general race consciousness” and “intra-racial diversity”); Todd Henderson, Symposium: What Proof 
Should We Demand to Justify Racist Policies?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 10:04 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-what-proof-should-we-demand-to-justify-racist-
policies/ [https://perma.cc/5U25-XZMM] (“I personally believe that racial inequality should be the most 
important policy issue of the day and that we should make radical changes to our education policy to 
give every American child a fair shot at success. But racist policies in higher education seem like an 
ineffective and potentially perverse mechanism to do this.”); John Paul Schnapper-Casteras, Symposium: 
Moving Forward from Fisher II, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 5:13 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-moving-forward-from-fisher-ii/
[https://perma.cc/4G9F-CBQS] (“The Supreme Court’s decision yesterday in Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin marks a major victory for universities and students throughout the country, and reaffirms 
the commonsense proposition that diversity along various lines—including racial diversity—yields 
significant educational benefits on college campuses.”); Elizabeth Slattery, Symposium: A Disappointing 
Decision, but More Lawsuits Are on the Way, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 1:13 PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-a-disappointing-decision-but-more-lawsuits-are-on-
the-way/ [https://perma.cc/N9RG-A4V9] (discussing the disadvantages of the Fisher decision); 
Kimberly West-Faulcon, Symposium: Surprisingly, Facts Rule the Day in Fisher II, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
24, 2016, 9:47 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-surprisingly-facts-rule-the-day-
in-fisher-ii/ [https://perma.cc/DAQ6-T9W3] (discussing the differences between racial affirmative action 
and racial discrimination). 
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Defend Affirmative Action,3 the dissents in Fisher II lay bare profound
dangers confronting proponents of affirmative action, regardless of the 
outcome in Fisher II. In addition to praising colorblindness, the Court has 
cast doubt on the very definition of race. 
In Schuette, Michigan had amended its state constitution to prevent the 
use of racial preferences by any university system or school district.4
Rejecting a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, the Court upheld Michigan’s 
law.5 The plurality went to considerable lengths to explain that Schuette in 
no way touched on the constitutionality or merits of race-based admissions.6
However, the Court also questioned whether it was possible any longer for 
the racial categories used in affirmative-action programs to have any value. 
“[I]n a society in which [racial] lines are becoming more blurred,” Schuette 
explains, “the attempt to define race-based categories . . . raises serious 
questions of its own.”7 The dissenters in Fisher II spotlight this argument, 
insisting that racial categories are “ill suited for the more integrated country 
that we are rapidly becoming.”8
Studying the origin of the argument at the heart of the Fisher II dissents, 
the Article explores the future of challenges to affirmative action. Historians 
and critical race theorists (CRTs) have long contended that race is a social 
construct—the product of struggles over class and political power.9 For these 
scholars, understanding race in this way exposes the institutional racism 
concealed by superficially neutral laws. 
                                                                                                                         
3 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rights & Fight for 
Equal. By Any Means Necessary, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014).
4 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 26 (West 2006).
5 Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1636.
6 Id. at 1630.
7 Id. at 1634.
8 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2230 (2016).
9 For a sample of historical work on the construction of race, see generally ARIELA J. GROSS, WHAT 
BLOOD WON’T TELL: A HISTORY OF RACE ON TRIAL IN AMERICA (2008) (examining the relationship 
between race, personal identity, culture, and the ability to achieve citizenship); MARTHA HODES, WHITE 
WOMEN, BLACK MEN: ILLICIT SEX IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY SOUTH (1997) (exploring the history 
of relationships between white women and black men and the white South’s response to these 
relationships prior to and following the Civil War); ELISE LEMIRE, “MISCEGENATION”: MAKING RACE 
IN AMERICA (2002) (discussing the social construction of race as it relates to interracial relationships and 
white supremacy); PEGGY PASCOE, WHAT COMES NATURALLY: MISCEGENATION LAW AND THE 
MAKING OF RACE IN AMERICA 1 (2009) (discussing the “rise of a social, political, and legal system of 
white supremacy that reigned through the 1960s and . . . beyond”); DANIEL J. SHARFSTEIN, THE 
INVISIBLE LINE: A SECRET HISTORY OF RACE IN AMERICA (2011) (detailing the historical background 
around three families’ stories and their experience with race). For a sample of CRT work on the 
construction of race, see RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: AN
INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012) (discussing the earliest origins of the critical race theory movement, the 
present state of critical race theory, and its future); IAN HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (2006) (discussing the relationship between colorblindness and white 
supremacy). Although CRT scholars cover a range of topics, the field shares a focus on “race, racism, 
and power” and “questions the . . . foundations of the liberal order.” DELGADO & STAFANCIC, supra, at 3.
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For decades, opponents of affirmative action dismissed these arguments 
out of hand. In the past, these activists consistently used race to describe the 
color of one’s skin, but the meaning of race itself had not played a central 
part in challenges to the constitutional legitimacy of affirmative action.10
However, Schuette and Fisher II represent the culmination of a process of 
movement-countermovement dialogue and consensus. Far from denying 
claims that race is a construct, opponents of affirmative action now use those 
claims to their advantage. For anti-affirmative-action amici and activists, the 
idea that race is a social construct now militates in favor of colorblindness.11
Since race is a social construct, it is argued to be devoid of meaning. Any 
use of race, in this account, becomes an unfair and incoherent allocation of 
government benefits.12
Regardless of whether it has stable meaning, race shapes individual 
opportunities and experiences.13 When voluntarily assumed, racial identities 
can be powerful expressions of self.14 As the new anti-affirmative-action
activism makes plain, the question is how courts can address racial 
discrimination when racial identities themselves are fluid and complex. The 
Article looks to employment discrimination law—and to “regarded-as” 
theories of liability—as a framework for judges seeking to address the reality 
of race discrimination without reifying racial categories.15 Under the 
                                                                                                                         
10 See, e.g., Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary 
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV. 985, 1028–29 (2007) (discussing the use of race as skin color in 
colorblindness claims).
11 E.g., Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioner at 3–7, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial 
Watch, Inc. & Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 2–6, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
12 E.g., Amicus Brief of the American Center for Law & Justice in Support of Petitioner at 5–7, 
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345); Brief of Amici Curiae Judicial 
Watch, Inc. & Allied Educational Foundation in Support of Petitioner at 3, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at 
Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (No. 11-345).
13 For a sample of the scholarship on racial identity formation, see Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe &
Bailey W. Jackson III, Introduction, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT:
INTEGRATING EMERGING FRAMEWORKS 1–11 (Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe ed., 2012); RACIAL 
IDENTITY THEORY: APPLICATION TO INDIVIDUAL, GROUP, AND ORGANIZATIONAL INTERVENTIONS
xii–1 (Chalmer E. Thompson & Robert T. Carter eds., 2012).
14 See, e.g., Camille Gear Rich, Affirmative Action in the Era of Elective Race: Racial 
Commodification and the Promise of the New Functionalism, 102 GEO. L.J. 179, 183 (2013) (tracing the 
shift in modern America “to a model that places primary emphasis on ‘elective race’ or voluntary, racial 
self-identification decisions”); Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations 
on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 61 (1994) (“[R]ace, because it is 
closely tied to communities, provides an essential component of identity.”).
15 See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being 
“Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS.
L. REV. 1283, 1288–89 (2005) (proposing the use of regarded-as theories in the context of Title VII race 
discrimination); Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy 
and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 1136 (2004) (criticizing current Title VII doctrine 
for failing to recognize claims based on racial identity performance in the workplace). This Article breaks 
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Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Americans with Disability 
Act Amendments Act of 2009 (ADAAA), a worker may in certain cases 
seek relief when she is regarded as disabled—regardless of whether she 
belongs to a protected class.16 Under such a “regarded-as” theory, what 
matters is not that an individual belongs to a particular biological or cultural 
category, but rather that the individual experiences the stereotypes 
associated with it. Regarded-as theories will allow courts to avoid placing 
individuals in one racial category or another. Instead, by turning to a 
developed body of law, courts can recognize the reality of discrimination 
without reinforcing the fiction of race.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I traces the origins of the 
movement-countermovement dialogue from which Schuette and Fisher II 
emerged. This Part lays out three influential phases in the history of 
opposition to affirmative action. This story begins with the fight led by 
Jewish organizations and unions to define legitimate affirmative action. 
While denouncing race-based quotas, these activists urged the government 
to introduce education and training programs designed to level the playing 
field. 
In the 1970s, as Part I shows, with a revival of white ethnic identity, 
opposition to affirmative action took a dramatic turn. As the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke17 makes 
clear, opponents of affirmative action began challenging the definition of a 
racial majority rather than the justice of antisubordination approaches to 
race. Identifying themselves as victims of discrimination, a variety of white 
ethnics urged the Court to extend constitutional protection to them.18 The 
colorblindness arguments now so familiar to scholars of affirmative action 
came to the fore when the recently mobilized New Right attacked the core
premise of antisubordination reasoning. 
As Part I demonstrates, the ascendancy of colorblindness rhetoric in the 
1990s and 2000s concealed a more complex story about efforts to respond 
to the diversity rationale developed prior to, and endorsed by, the Supreme 
Court in Grutter v. Bollinger.19 Some activists echoed earlier arguments 
about the unfairness of race-specific policies. Gradually, however, 
                                                                                                                         
new ground by exploring how regarded-as theories matter in a radically different racial politics—one 
defined by changing arguments against affirmative action. The Article also offers the first look at how 
these theories should respond to powerful new arguments against an anti-subordination vision of the 
Constitution.
16 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A) (2012); Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes 
Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2062 (2013) (“The ADAAA . . .
protect[s] any individual who is treated adversely because of an actual or perceived impairment without 
regard to the existence of any functional limitation.”).
17 See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 271, 319 (1978) (holding that a 
university admissions program that relies predominantly upon race for admissions decisions is unlawful).
18 Id. at 277–78.
19 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (holding that public universities may consider race 
as a factor in student admissions, though only temporarily).
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opponents of affirmative action began presenting the very idea of diversity 
as incoherent. Borrowing from claims about race made by historians and 
CRTs, affirmative-action opponents maintained that the categories 
universities used to achieve diversity were arbitrary and unjust. 
Drawing on this historical narrative, Part II foregrounds the new threat 
to affirmative-action programs articulated in Schuette and Fisher II.
The future of affirmative-action law will depend on more than the 
Court’s understanding of how strict scrutiny operates in the context of race. 
The fate of affirmative action in the courts will also depend on whether 
progressives can reconcile support for an antisubordination vision of the 
Constitution with the belief that race is a social construct. 
Part III develops a legal framework to address new anti-affirmative-
action arguments about the social construction of race. Looking to ADA case 
law and Title VII individual disparate treatment cases, the Article proposes 
that affirmative-action law should recognize that individuals may suffer 
serious—and adverse—consequences when they are regarded as members 
of a particular race. As regarded-as reasoning shows, relevant decision
makers rely not only on skin color, but also on a variety of proxies—
including class, education, place of residence, dress, voice, and name—in 
judging an individual’s racial identity.
Part III also confronts potential problems with applying regarded-as 
reasoning in the context of university admissions. When students categorize 
themselves by race, admissions officers explicitly ask about racial identity, 
and minority status often strengthens applicants’ candidacies. An 
examination of the Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race in Postsecondary 
Admissions issued by the Departments of Education and Justice reveals that 
some admissions officers likely already rely on regarded-as reasoning.20 The 
use of proxies allows universities to comply with the Supreme Court’s race-
discrimination mandates while limiting self-serving behavior. At the same 
time, regarded-as reasoning better captures the fluidity of racial identity. The 
Article closes with a brief conclusion.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ANTI-AFFIRMATIVE-ACTION 
MOVEMENT, 1961 TO THE PRESENT
Opposition to affirmative action emerged almost as soon as the first 
race-conscious remedial programs took shape. However, the movement 
against affirmative action changed substantially over time. Justice Alito’s 
invocation of a post-racial society in Fisher II is no accident. Instead, the 
argument about racial categories at work in Fisher II and Schuette arose in 
the aftermath of an unpredictable and decades-long struggle about the 
                                                                                                                         
20 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDANCE ON THE VOLUNTARY USE OF RACE
IN POSTSECONDARY ADMISSIONS 3, 5–6 (2011), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/
ocr/docs/guidance-pse-201111.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9DE-SY47].
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meaning of discrimination and race. Understanding the origins of this 
argument makes clear the new challenges likely to face universities with 
affirmative-action programs.
In the mid-1960s, Jewish organizations and the labor movement 
mobilized to oppose what they described as race-based quotas.21 Many of 
these advocates, however, claimed to speak for “true” affirmative action—
measures to recruit, train, and fairly measure the abilities of minority 
candidates.22 These early struggles addressed the meaning of affirmative 
action as much as they did the legitimacy of state-sponsored efforts to 
combat racial subordination. In the mid-1970s, the movement began to 
change, as a white ethnic revival spread across the United States.23 A variety 
of Jews, Italian-, Greek-, and Polish-Americans defined themselves as 
minorities deserving of state solicitude. This new argument again assumed 
the legitimacy of the basic principle underlying affirmative action.
By the early 1980s, both of these factions began to lose influence, as the 
Democratic Party reinforced its support for affirmative action, and the 
Republican Party firmed up its opposition to race-conscious policies.24 As 
the political parties realigned, conservatives came to define the anti-
affirmative-action agenda, linking constitutional values of colorblindness to 
a faith in small government and suspicion of entitlement programs.25
Together, the Reagan administration and the New Right created a new anti-
affirmative-action agenda that was inextricably tied to the substantive goals 
of the grassroots conservative movement.26
Change defined the story of the affirmative-action movement—shifting 
arguments, members, and goals. When we understand the fluidity of the 
movement, we can see more clearly that Schuette and Fisher II represent a 
new chapter in the affirmative-action struggle.
A. The Birth of a Movement, 1961–1969
The term “affirmative action” came into the American vocabulary in 
1961, when President John F. Kennedy issued an executive order requiring 
                                                                                                                         
21 See ERIC J. SUNDQUIST, STRANGERS IN THE LAND: BLACKS, JEWS, POST-HOLOCAUST AMERICA
76–77 (2005) (“Many Jews, on the basis of recent experience, remembered racial quotas as a 
discriminatory means of denying them access to education and employment.”).
22 See id. at 76 (explaining that Jews showed great support for the civil rights movement’s goal of 
achieving equal opportunity and freedom from discrimination but feared the preferential policies of 
affirmative action).
23 See id. (noting that Jewish-, Italian-, Greek-, and Polish-Americans all filed amicus briefs that 
opposed race-based preferences in the college admission process).
24 WILLIE AVON DRAKE & ROBERT D. HOLSWORTH, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND THE STALLED 
QUEST FOR BLACK PROGRESS 13, 20 (1996).
25 Id. at 16.
26 See id. at 20 (“In the 1980s, the major strains of the conservative attack on affirmative action 
were institutionalized in the Reagan administration.”).
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federal employers to take “affirmative action” in combating racial 
discrimination.27 Two years later, the executive order was extended to cover 
federally financed construction projects.28 Kennedy himself denied that 
affirmative action involved or required quotas, but other influential 
Democrats, including the leaders of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and the United States Commission on Civil Rights, 
came to believe that quotas were necessary to make a dent in the legacy of 
slavery and Jim Crow.29 By 1965, the EEOC required employers to submit 
forms breaking down their workforce by sex and race.30 Within three years, 
states could receive block grants in order to identify disparate employment 
patterns; employers could face a variety of sanctions.31 In the meantime, a 
debate about the importance of quotas and about the meaning of affirmative 
action had begun in the academy and in American politics.
The early anti-affirmative-action movement was complex and drew 
heavily from the ranks of the New Deal coalition and the American left. 
Since the mid-1960s, members of skilled trades and construction unions had 
tended to oppose any form of remedial program for racial minorities, 
worrying about the loss of control over hiring and promotion.32 Industrial 
unions, like the AFL-CIO, favored affirmative action until such programs 
posed a challenge to seniority-based preferences in employment.33
Although the Jewish community would remain divided about 
affirmative action throughout the 1970s, organizations like the American 
Jewish Committee (AJC) and the American Jewish Congress (the Congress) 
also led the first efforts to articulate a vision of a colorblind Constitution. 
The AJC was formed in 1906 by Jewish community leaders concerned about 
pogroms in Russia.34 In its early years, the AJC focused on protecting the 
civil liberties and religious freedoms of Jews.35 By the 1950s, the AJC had 
expanded its mandate, arguing that all forms of discrimination based on race 
or ethnicity reinforced the bias experienced by Jews and other minority 
                                                                                                                         
27 Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. § 301 (Supp. 1961).
28 See DENNIS DESLIPPE, PROTESTING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE STRUGGLE OVER EQUALITY 
AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 19 (2012).
29 See id. at 20–21.
30 See id. at 22–23.
31 See id. at 25–26.
32 See id. at 27–28.
33 See id. at 28–32.
34 See, e.g., DAVID BIALE, POWER AND POWERLESSNESS IN JEWISH HISTORY 125 (1986) 
(discussing the founding of the AJC); Jewish Committee Meets, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1907, at 16 
(discussing the AJC’s early years).
35 See, e.g., $1,000,000 Sought for Jews in Russia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1929, at 10 (discussing the 
early activities of the AJC); Jews Here Reply to Hitler’s Charge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1935, at 15 (adding 
further insight into the AJC’s early activities).
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groups.36 The AJC specialized in sociological research documenting the 
psychological harms worked by discrimination.37 Indeed, this research 
figured centrally in the litigation of Brown v. Board of Education.38
By the late 1960s, however, the AJC had come out against “quotas.” In 
1969, for example, the AJC issued a statement favoring what it called “true 
affirmative action” while opposing quotas.39 The statement explained: 
[W]e cannot ignore the growing concern on the part of many 
Jews and members of other ethnic groups that the burden of 
needed social changes may especially fall on them and limit 
their opportunities for advancement. Care must be taken in 
advancing compensatory and preferential treatment for 
disadvantaged minorities that our sense of outrage for what 
they have endured does not cause us to lose sight of our sense 
of the needs and aspirations of other groups.40
If, as the AJC reasoned, quotas were a zero-sum game, other 
disadvantaged ethnic groups would necessarily pay the price for the 
inclusion of racial minorities.41 Between 1969 and 1972, the AJC and other 
organizations refined their arguments. “Individual rights,” the New York 
Chapter of the AJC asserted in a 1971 statement on affirmative action, 
“which are a cornerstone of our Constitution, must be preserved and 
protected.”42 AJC President Philip Hoffman advanced a similar view when 
writing to presidential candidates Richard Nixon and George McGovern.43
AJC Vice President Bertram H. Gold summarized this vision, stating that 
“the American system, which is an open society, is based on individual 
                                                                                                                         
36 For contemporary discussion of such initiatives, see, for example, Two Groups Open Drive 
Against Bias, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1952, at 65 (discussing a program “‘to provide a stronger impact on 
the American mind concerning the evils of anti-Semitism’ and other forms of racial and religious bigotry 
and discrimination”); Survey Finds U.S. Hurt By Till Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 1955, at 40 (describing 
the committee’s report and its recommendations); 50 Years Marked by Jewish Group, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
7, 1957, at 120 (discussing the AJC’s history and achievements); Civil Rights Gains of Decade Hailed,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1957, at 132 (discussing advancements in the civil rights movement over the prior 
decade).
37 See, e.g., STUART SVONKIN, JEWS AGAINST PREJUDICE: AMERICAN JEWS AND THE FIGHT FOR 
CIVIL LIBERTIES 66–68 (1997).
38 See id. at 67 (explaining the AJC’s influence on the work of Professor Kenneth Clark, whose 
White House Conference paper was cited by Chief Justice Earl Warren in Brown v. Board of Education).
39 Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Position Statement on Compensatory & Preferential 
Treatment in Educ. & Emp’t 2–3 (Nov. 11, 1969) (on file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
40 Id. at 2.
41 See id. (“It is perhaps inevitable that in the short run, compensatory and preferential programs, 
such as those described above will result in some people being adversely affected.”).
42 Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., N.Y. Chapter Statement on Affirmative Action 1 (May 1, 
1972) (on file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
43 See Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Facts Behind the News 1–2 (Aug. 25, 1972) (on file with 
Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.) (discussing correspondence between Hoffman and both President 
Nixon and Sen. McGovern).
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rights, not group rights. We are opposed to quotas because quotas are the 
negation of judging a man on his worth alone.”44
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Jewish groups like the AJC and the 
Congress remained divided about what kinds of affirmative action were 
defensible. Founded in 1918, the Congress formed to be a democratic, 
representative group for Jewish leaders across the nation.45 In the 1940s, the 
organization took a leading role in protesting Nazism in Germany, serving 
as a liaison between the United States Government and European Jews 
seeking refuge in the United States.46 In the 1950s, the Congress also took 
part in the civil rights movement, and one of its leaders played a vital role in 
planning Martin Luther King’s 1963 March on Washington.47
However, like the AJC, the Congress viewed the issue of affirmative 
action with considerable ambivalence. For example, in May 1969, when the 
Congress debated the subject, members disagreed about whether “‘benign’ 
quotas” deserved support. One member, a professor at Rutgers, maintained 
that quotas were necessary to increase the access of racial minorities to 
quality education.48 While maintaining that quotas were “deleterious to [a] 
democratic system,” others offered alternative methods of helping 
                                                                                                                         
44 Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., News From the Comm. 1 (Aug. 16, 1972) (on file with Am. 
Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
45 On the early years of the Congress, see, for example, Jewish Congress to Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
11, 1919, at 8 (discussing the reconvening of the American Jewish Congress to receive its delegates’ 
reports from the Paris Peace Conference); Jews Seek Hearing at Peace Table, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
1918, at 11 (explaining the American Jewish Congress’ plans to send a delegation of Jews to the Paris 
Peace Conference to lobby for full civil and political rights worldwide); American Jewish Congress to 
Meet, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1918, at 2 (“The American Jewish Congress will convene in 
Philadelphia . . . to consider means of obtaining political and religious freedom for Jews throughout the 
world.”).
46 See, e.g., Jews Pay Tribute to Hitler Victims, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1943, at 6 (discussing a 
memorial service for Jews killed due to Hitler’s persecutions); Wise Asks Roosevelt Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 
23, 1943, at 11 (describing the conversation between President Roosevelt and the president of the 
American Jewish Congress regarding Jewish casualties in Axis-controlled countries); Embargo on 
Exports to Germany Urged, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1940, at 6 (discussing American Jewish Congress and 
Jewish Labor Committee pleas for a moral embargo against sending American goods to Germany);
Rescue at Once of Europe’s Jews Demanded at Conference Here, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 1943, at 1
(discussing demands by speakers at the American Jewish Conference for immediate rescue of Jews in 
Nazi-controlled countries and a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine).
47 See, e.g., Irving Spiegel, Jewish Unit To Meet on Civil Liberties, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1950, at 
11 (describing Jewish groups’ support of civil liberties); Failure to Attack Bias Is Denounced, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 19, 1952, at 20 (“The American Jewish Congress and the [NAACP] . . . assailed Federal, 
state and municipal governments for failure last year to take ‘forthright action’ to eliminate 
discrimination and segregation and to stop illegal attacks against minority groups.”); E.W. Kenworthy, 
200,000 March for Civil Rights in Orderly Washington Rally; President Sees Gain for Negro, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 29, 1963, at 1 (discussing pleas by civil-rights leaders for laws ending racial segregation).
48 Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, American Jewish Congress (May 12, 1969), in The 
American Jewish Congress Papers, Box 34, American Jewish Historical Society, New York, New York.
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minorities, including “a shift to consideration of the factors of financial and 
economic need.”49
Later, at a 1972 meeting of its executive committee, some members of 
the Congress favored the use of numerical goals “during a transitional period 
until equality [could] be achieved.”50 Other members of the Congress 
acknowledged that, while “[t]here [was] little argument that blacks had been 
discriminated against by society,” any form of special treatment for 
minorities would be unfair and would “severely retard, if not impede 
altogether, a full scale assault on the problems of all the poor and 
unemployed, which are the real issues and demand major attention.”51 The 
organization could not agree even on a compromise resolution stating 
opposition to any government program that “require[d], permit[ted], or 
[made] predictable any discrimination against any ethnic, racial, or religious 
group or groups,” deciding to table it by a vote of 13 to 11.52
The AJC was similarly divided throughout the early 1970s. Some 
chapters, including the one based at its New York headquarters, seriously 
considered endorsing the use of goals and timetables, and even opponents of 
quotas worried that seemingly neutral tests used to measure individual merit 
unduly favored those in the white majority, constituting “a denial of the very 
merit principle we profess to support.”53
Generally, however, a majority in the Congress and the AJC opposed 
quotas while endorsing recruiting and training programs as “true” and just 
affirmative action. These arguments echoed the views expressed in Gunnar 
Myrdal’s monumental An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and 
Modern Democracy.54 Published in 1944, Myrdal’s book argued that 
Americans were torn between their ideals and the realities of racism, 
segregation, and discrimination.55 Myrdal identified American 
commitments to democracy and egalitarianism as important weapons 
against Jim Crow.56 He suggested that if Americans lived up to their own 
ideals, de jure segregation could not last long.57
                                                                                                                         
49 Id. at 5–6.
50 Executive Committee Meeting Minutes, American Jewish Congress (Mar. 16, 1972), in The 
American Jewish Congress Papers, Box 6, American Jewish Historical Society, New York, New York.
51 Id. at 2. 
52 Id. at 14.
53 DESLIPPE, supra note 28, at 86.
54 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
(1944).
55 See id. at 75, 1021 (explaining the flaws of using the idealistic “class struggle” doctrine to deny 
race problems in America, and discussing the American hypocrisy of permitting racial oppression at 
home while fighting for liberty abroad).
56 See id. at 1021 (discussing America’s opportunity to amend its past racial failures).
57 See id. (“[T]he great reason for hope is that [America] has a national experience of uniting racial 
and cultural diversities and a national theory, if not a consistent practice, of freedom and equality for 
all.”).
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Myrdal’s influential ideas reflected one strand of argument offered by 
the NAACP in Brown.58 His arguments also helped to cement a liberal 
alliance committed to the achievement of civil rights reforms.59 By the 
1960s, however, liberal consensus about Myrdal’s arguments had 
collapsed.60 Movement activists and commentators argued that Myrdal had 
been naive about the pervasiveness of racism in American society.61 Rather 
than being a matter of individual attitudes, racism shaped important 
institutions and laws.62
For the AJC, by contrast, prescriptions like those set forth by Myrdal 
still rang true. The AJC believed that neutrality was constitutionally 
necessary and politically possible, and the organization argued that relying 
on individual merit would dismantle, rather than reinforce, existing racial 
hierarchies.63 At the same time, the organization favored some 
race-conscious remedial programs—if only those designed to prepare 
                                                                                                                         
58 As Christopher Schmidt has shown, however, reasoning similar to Myrdal’s was not the only 
kind of argument used by the NAACP in Brown, and the Court was not obviously deciding the case only 
on the basis of Myrdal-style arguments. See Christopher W. Schmidt, Essay, Brown and 
the Colorblind Constitution, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 207 (2008) (distinguishing “anticlassification” 
arguments from “antisubordination” arguments).
59 See, e.g., WALTER JACKSON, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND AMERICA’S CONSCIENCE: SOCIAL 
ENGINEERING AND RACIAL LIBERATION, 1938–1987 at 261 (1994) (“An American Dilemma was the key 
book in shaping a new liberal consensus on racial issues.”).
60 See, e.g., JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974 at 22
(1997) (“During the racial confrontations of the 1960s, An American Dilemma encountered rising 
criticism from activists and scholars who disputed Myrdal’s optimism about white liberalism, as well as 
his negative statements about certain aspects of African-American culture.”); DAVID CARROLL 
COCHRAN, THE COLOR OF FREEDOM: RACE AND CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 28 (1999) (“Beginning 
in the mid-1960s, many would denounce the book’s view of black culture as a ‘pathological’ response to 
white bigotry and find its optimistic prediction of an eventual end to racial injustice naïve.”);
CHRISTOPHER SHANNON, A WORLD MADE SAFE FOR DIFFERENCES: COLD WAR INTELLECTUALS AND 
THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 48 (2001) (discussing Ralph Ellison’s mid-1960s criticism of Myrdal’s book).
61 See, e.g., López, supra note 10, at 999–1000 (critiquing Myrdal’s analysis for failing to 
emphasize inherent, structural racial subordination as the main reason for inequality).
62 See, e.g., id. (proclaiming that racism is inherent in American society as opposed to only 
stemming from the views of irrational bigots). For arguments of this kind from the period, see generally
ROBERT L. ALLEN, BLACK AWAKENING IN CAPITALIST AMERICA: AN ANALYTIC HISTORY 5 (1990)
(agreeing with Truman Nelson’s analysis: “implicit in [Nelson’s analysis] are the conclusions drawn by 
black revolutionaries: that the American oppressive system in its totality is ‘unconstitutional’; that this 
same system long ago decided and still maintains that oppressed blacks indeed have ‘no rights which a 
white man is bound to respect’ . . . .”); WINTHROP D. JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN 
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550–1812 (1968) (discussing the history and development of 
European and Anglo-American perceptions of blacks, and justifications for race-based slavery); 
STOKELY CARMICHAEL & CHARLES V. HAMILTON, BLACK POWER: THE POLITICS OF LIBERATION IN 
AMERICA 4 (1967) (“[Institutional racism] is less overt [than individual racism], far more subtle, less 
identifiable in terms of specific individuals committing the acts. But it is no less destructive of human 
life. [Institutional racism] originates in the operation of established and respected forces in the society, 
and thus receives far less public condemnation than the first type.”).
63 See Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Statement on Affirmative Action 1–2 (Dec. 3, 1972) (on 
file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.) (arguing that quotas are insufficient to solving systematic 
racism, and urging programs designed to help historically disadvantaged minorities).
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candidates rather than those geared toward hiring or admission decisions.64
The AJC also acknowledged that some tests used to measure individual 
merit, if not the idea of individual merit, rewarded membership in a 
dominant group rather than actual talent.65
These apparent contradictions made sense as part of the AJC’s 
commitment to “true” affirmative action. The organization wanted to 
identify race-conscious remedial programs that would not be inconsistent 
with ideals of neutrality, individual merit, and equal opportunity. The quest 
to defend “true” affirmative action revealed the ambivalence of early 
affirmative-action opponents about antisubordination values or remedial 
programs. The movement resisted arguments that racism had infected 
seemingly neutral institutions and laws. In the early 1970s, however, the 
movement still embraced the basic idea of affirmative action as necessary 
and just.66
Similar arguments animated the litigation of DeFunis v. Odegaard, the 
first Supreme Court case on affirmative action in higher education.67 Marco 
DeFunis, Jr., a Jewish man from Seattle, challenged the University of 
Washington Law School affirmative-action policy after being denied 
admission to the class of 1971.68 The media portrayed the affirmative-action
battle as part of the collapse of a powerful civil rights coalition, a war 
between blacks and Jews, between visions of the Constitution based on 
ending group subordination or, alternatively, on allowing individuals to 
prove their own merit.69 For example, African-American columnist William 
Raspberry argued in 1972: 
The fight against affirmative action programs designed to help 
blacks and other minorities into the American mainstream is 
being led by Jews. . . . And it may be that attempts at making 
the campuses more representative of the country are seen by 
Jews as attacks on their special preserve.70
The Court ultimately held that DeFunis was moot, since, pursuant to an 
order from the trial court, he had been attending the University of 
Washington Law School since 1971 and was soon scheduled to graduate.71
                                                                                                                         
64 Id.
65 See id. at 1–3 (discussing the need for truly objective tests in hiring, and acknowledging problems 
with allegedly objective tests in the past).
66 Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., Affirmative Action Program Statement 1 (Nov. 13, 1972) 
(on file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.).
67 416 U.S. 312, 312 (1974).
68 Id.
69 See Nina Totenberg, Discriminating to End Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1974, at 36 
(“Arguments in the case are all very proper and legalistic. Yet, for whatever reason, the whole affirmative 
action question seems to bring out the worst in Jews and blacks, and their feelings about each other.”).
70 Id.
71 DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 318–19.
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Speaking on behalf of DeFunis’s allies, the AJC maintained that affirmative 
action was appropriate and constitutional so long as quotas were not 
involved.72 As Elmer Winter, the leader of the AJC, explained, “the primary 
goal, in our view, is the establishment of affirmative actions and processes 
that provide disadvantaged minorities a realistic opportunity in education 
and employment while avoiding the dangers of reverse discrimination.”73
B. Bakke and the White Ethnic Revival
Between the decisions of DeFunis and Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke, the anti-affirmative-action movement changed 
substantially. White ethnics mobilized, contending that they suffered as 
serious a social disadvantage as did the people of color for whom affirmative 
action programs had conventionally been designed.74 In major newspapers, 
white-male academics attacked university hiring policies that favored 
women and people of color.75 For the first time, white males brought more 
than one hundred Title VII discrimination suits before the EEOC.76 These 
activists no longer claimed to understand the true meaning of fair affirmative 
                                                                                                                         
72 See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Jewish Comm., News From the Comm. 1–2 (Apr. 24, 1974) (on 
file with Am. Jewish Comm. Library, N.Y.C.) (“The American Jewish Committee had filed [an amicus 
brief], charging that the University’s establishment of dual standards of admission, one for whites and 
one for blacks, constituted a quota system and was therefore unconstitutional.”).
73 Id.
74 Claims of this kind are exemplified in various articles. See, e.g., Richard Capozzola, Letter to the 
Editor, Bias Against Italians, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1969, at 26 (expressing concerns that 
Italian-Americans were being overlooked for top-level appointments); Francis X. Clines, 20 Other Italian 
Groups Meet with State Rights Chief in Complaints of Bias, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1971, at 15 (describing 
a meeting at which concerns regarding discrimination against Italian-Americans in promotion decisions 
were discussed); Michael Novak, Black and White in Catholic Eyes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1975, at 33 
(exploring the tension between the black and white-ethnic Catholic populations of 1970s Boston, and 
commenting on how the two are more similar in terms of plight than they each recognize); Jonathan 
Randal, U.S. Challenged by Polish Leader, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1968, at 13 (describing how the leader 
of Poland’s Communist party challenged the United States to prove that Polish-Americans were less 
discriminated against than Jews in Poland); Walter H. Waggoner, A ‘White N.A.A.C.P.’ Set Up in 
Newark, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1973, at 79 (discussing the new legal-aid service established in Newark, 
New Jersey for white ethnics in the area); Craig Whitney, Italians Picket F.B.I. Office Here, N.Y. TIMES,
May 2, 1970, at 35 (explaining how the head of one of the six Mafia “families” led a picket line in front 
of the F.B.I. headquarters in protests of anti-Italian discrimination).
75 See, e.g., Iver Peterson, College Scored on Hiring Women, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1972, at 44 
(describing how the efforts made to diffuse the myth that affirmative-action policies would result in 
reverse discrimination were failing and meeting significant resistance); Tom Wicker, A Misplaced Anger,
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1974, at 19 (arguing that the anger harbored by Americans regarding 
implementation of affirmative-action programs is misplaced, comparing it to being angry at a “painful 
treatment” rather than at “the wound or illness that made it necessary”); Tom Wicker, No Retreat Needed,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1975, at 33 (describing a memo written by the Office of Civil Rights of the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that attempted to clarify the meaning of “affirmative 
action” requirements for schools).
76 See, e.g., U.S. to Check on Complaints of Reverse Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1972, 
at 23 (describing how the United States had appointed an ombudsman to investigate complaints of reverse 
discrimination in the college acceptance process).
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action. Instead, activists defined themselves—as Italians, Poles, Greeks, or 
Jews—as belonging to a true minority that deserved “special treatment.”77
Ian Haney López has carefully examined arguments about race as 
ethnicity.78 He focuses on the importance of studies by sociologists Nathan 
Glazer and Daniel Patrick Moynihan.79 Glazer and Moynihan described 
America not as a racially stratified society, but rather as a pluralistic place 
in which culturally distinct ethnic groups competed and collaborated with 
one another.80 López is right to acknowledge the influence of this idea, and 
he compellingly traces its impact on later thinking about race and the 
Constitution.81
White ethnic identity was complex, however, and it arose because of a 
number of interrelated social and economic factors. What historian Matthew 
Frye Jacobson has called the “white ethnic revival” marked race relations in 
the 1960s and 1970s.82 The revival manifested itself in a new national
passion for genealogy and ethnic pride in art, television programming, and 
movies celebrating ethnic differences, in public consumption of products 
celebrating ethnic pride, and in a new sense of grievance among white 
ethnics.83 Between 1967 and 1970, a variety of new ethnic organizations 
formed, including the American Committee for Democracy and Freedom in 
Greece (1967), the National Association for Irish Justice (1970), the Serbian 
National Committee (1968), and the Latvian Foundation (1970).84 In this
                                                                                                                         
77 See, e.g., Capozzola, supra note 74, at 26 (expressing concerns about Italian-Americans being 
overlooked in top-level position appointments); see also Randal, supra note 74, at 13 (describing efforts 
to challenge the government to prove that Polish-Americans were less discriminated against than Polish 
Jews); Waggoner, supra note 74, at 35 (discussing the efforts to oppose discrimination against white-
ethnics in the United States).
78 See López, supra note 10, at 1006–11 (discussing the relationship between race and ethnicity and 
how it affects the cultural make-up of the United States).
79 Id. at 991, 1007–10.
80 Id. at 1008–09.
81 See id. at 1046–51 (discussing the Supreme Court’s application of colorblind reasoning, and 
tracing this doctrine’s development over time).
82 MATTHEW FRYE JACOBSON, ROOTS TOO: WHITE ETHNIC REVIVAL IN POST-CIVIL RIGHTS 
AMERICA 8 (2006); see also STEFANO LUCONI, FROM PAESANI TO WHITE ETHNICS: THE ITALIAN 
AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN PHILADELPHIA 9 (2001) (describing the white ethnic movement as it 
pertained to Italian-Americans in the 1960s); JONATHAN RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS 
OF BROOKLYN AGAINST LIBERALISM 118 (1987); JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION 278 (2002) (commenting on the emergence of white-ethnic politics during the mid-to-late 
1960s).
83 See, e.g., JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 3–10 (describing a number of ways in which individuals 
with ethnic heritage sought to reconnect with their forgotten customs and traditions).
84 See, e.g., id. at 28 (listing various ethnically-affiliated groups that arose during this time period). 
For a sample of coverage of the work done by these organizations, see Irish Appeal Seeks Funds to 
Rebuild Belfast Street, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1970, at 20 (discussing Irish efforts to raise money to build 
new homes in Belfast); Irish Group Pickets B.O.A.C., N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1970, at 13 (describing the 
National Association for Irish Justice’s picket of a British corporation); For Greek Democracy,
N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1971, at 38 (describing the American Committee for Democracy and Freedom in 
Greece).
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period, moreover, ethnic consciousness dramatically increased. For 
example, a study commissioned by the United States Census in the early 
1970s found that a million more people identified as Polish-American than 
had a few years before.85
The white ethnic revival partly reflected intense nationalist sentiment 
provoked by Soviet intervention in Eastern and Central Europe, the 
“Troubles” in Ireland, and the Israeli Wars of 1967 and 1970.86 The revival 
borrowed from the rhetoric and the symbolism of the civil-rights movement. 
As civil-rights activists invoked “Black pride,” white ethnics wore             
tam-o’-shanter hats or waved Italian or Irish flags.87
White ethnics also claimed to have been victimized by past 
discrimination on the part of a broader Anglo-Saxon Protestant majority. For 
example, the Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs, founded in New Jersey in 
1978, was designed to “combat discrimination against ‘white ethnics’ at 
middle- and upper-management jobs.”88 The organization’s director 
explained to the New York Times: “We want no slowdown in the 
advancement of blacks and browns, but we don’t want their advancement at 
the expense of white ethnics.”89
Such claims made some headway. In 1971, the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare (HEW) offered some assistance to white ethnics but 
stopped short of instituting the timetables or hiring goals available to people 
of color.90 White ethnic grievance also played out in the courts. For example, 
Phillip DiLeo, a rejected applicant to the University of Colorado Law 
School, argued in court that affirmative-action programs should give equal 
consideration to African-American and Italian-American minority 
members.91
By the mid-1970s, a wide array of white ethnic organizations had come 
out against affirmative action. These activists demanded a new legal and 
social definition of a disadvantaged minority. For these activists, 
“minorities” included any distinct group that had experienced past 
discrimination and continued to suffer from its legacy. For example, in 1977, 
the Jewish Advocate, a magazine in the New England area, complained that 
                                                                                                                         
85 JACOBSON, supra note 82, at 48.
86 See id. at 26.
87 See, e.g., John Kifner, 6000 in Boston Protest Bust, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1974, at 19. The 
antibusing movement at times used a kind of hybrid flag, combining the American flag with elements of 
the Italian and Irish flags. See, e.g., John Kifner, 2 Boston Rues at Odds on Busing, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
1975, at 19.
88 Waggoner, supra note 74, at 35. 
89 Id.
90 See, e.g., DESLIPPE, supra note 28, at 92.
91 See Univ. of Colo. v. DiLeo, 540 P.2d 486, 492–93 (Colo. 1978). The DiLeo court ultimately 
held that the applicant lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the University’s affirmative-
action policy, since he lacked the qualifications to have been admitted had no such program existed. Id.
at 489–90. 
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existing affirmative action programs “exclude[d] the Jewish community and 
other white minority groups in this country.”92 Other white ethnic groups 
and conservative activists took up similar claims. As right-wing activist Pat 
Buchanan argued in 1977, “the fact is that Eastern European and 
Mediterranean ethnic groups really aren’t much further up the executive 
ladder than non-whites.”93
When Bakke came before the Court, white ethnics in the anti-
affirmative-action movement focused on similar efforts to contest the 
definition of minority status. Bakke involved a challenge to the 
affirmative-action program in place at the University of California-Davis 
Medical School.94 Davis had a policy of admitting “special 
applicants” under provisions either for members of “minority groups” (such 
as African-Americans) or for those who were “economically and/or 
educationally disadvantaged.”95 While many Caucasians had applied under 
this second provision, none had been successful.96 The Medical School 
rejected the application of Alan Bakke, an American of Norwegian descent, 
and he sued, arguing that Davis’s affirmative-action program violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.97
Amicus briefs in Bakke often stressed that affirmative-action programs 
should protect white ethnic minorities as well as non-white ones. For 
example, an amicus brief submitted on behalf of the AJC and other white 
ethnic groups explained: 
Nor can all whites by any stretch of the imagination properly 
be considered “advantaged.” Rarely, if ever, for instance, have 
whites from poverty-stricken Appalachia been singled out as 
a group for preferential educational treatment. Nor has 
favoritism been bestowed on members of other ethnic groups,
which can credibly claim to have been subject to generalized 
societal discrimination—Italians, Poles, Greeks, Slavs—as the 
result of which some people bear the economic and cultural 
scars of prejudice.98
The Young Americans for Freedom (YAF), an anticommunist, socially 
conservative group, raised a similar challenge to the definition of a 
“minority” deserving of affirmative action under the Fourteenth 
                                                                                                                         
92 Patrick Buchanan, Reverse Discrimination Advocates Must Go, HUM. EVENTS, Nov. 15, 1975, at 
9 (quoting the Jewish Advocate).
93 Id.
94 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 277 (1978).
95 Id. at 274.
96 Id. at 276.
97 Id. at 276–78.
98 Brief for the American Jewish Committee as Amici Curiae at 41–42, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. 
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811). 
2018] WHAT IS RACE? 297
Amendment. “Jews, Poles, Italians, Japanese, [and] Chinese are all part of 
the majority now,” the YAF contended.99
These dissimilar groups have each endured past 
discrimination. Who but the most sheltered could avoid 
hearing words such as Kike, Dago, Wop, Polack, Chink, 
Shanty Irish, and Jap. Yet what protection or special treatment 
is accorded these groups who have in the past and still suffer 
the effects of overt discrimination?100
Anti-affirmative-action understandings of “minority” status informed 
the arguments about diversity and other proposed justifications for 
affirmative action offered in Justice Powell’s opinion in Bakke. The 
University had argued that Alan Bakke’s equal-protection argument lacked 
merit because whites had not suffered the history of discrimination and 
subordination that defined traditionally recognized minorities.101 In rejecting 
this claim, Powell took up anti-affirmative-action claims about the difficulty 
of defining “minority” status.102 “[T]he United States,” Powell explained, 
“ha[s] become a nation of minorities. Each had to struggle—and some 
struggle still—to overcome the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but 
of a ‘majority’ composed of various minority groups . . . .”103
In Powell’s view, minority status reflected a history of past 
discrimination rather than a particular, entrenched, deeply rooted racial 
hierarchy, so white ethnics could “lay claim to a history of prior
discrimination” as much as could people of color.104 And if everyone who 
had experienced past discrimination could benefit from special preferences, 
“a new minority of white Anglo-Saxon Protestants” would be created and 
made vulnerable to discrimination.105
Courts could not competently determine which groups had suffered 
more prejudice, Powell asserted.106 Prejudice itself would be ever-changing 
and that much harder to measure. “The kind of variable sociological and 
                                                                                                                         
99 Brief for the Young Americans for Freedom et al. as Amicus Curiae at 10, Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (No. 76-811).
100 Id.
101 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 287–88 (describing the state’s argument that strict scrutiny was 
inappropriately applied by the lower courts in Bakke because such scrutiny “should be reserved for 
classifications that disadvantage ‘discrete and insular minorities’” (quoting United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))).
102 See id. at 288 (describing the respondent’s argument that the lower courts in Bakke correctly 
rejected strict scrutiny on the grounds that minority status should not be restricted to the Carolene
“discrete and insular” standard).
103 Id. at 292 (footnotes omitted).
104 Id. at 295.
105 Id. at 295–96.
106 See id. at 296–97 (finding no feasible “principled basis for deciding which groups would merit 
‘heightened judicial solicitude’ and which would not”).
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political analysis needed to produce . . . rankings [of prejudice],” Powell 
concluded, “simply does not lie within the judicial competence . . . .”107
Bakke fractured the Court. Two separate four-justice factions joined 
different parts of Powell’s opinion, which held that while diversity was a 
compelling state interest and some affirmative-action programs passed 
constitutional muster, the UC Davis policy went too far.108
Given the deep divide on the Court, the reach of Bakke remained unclear 
until the decision of Grutter decades later. Just the same, the opinion 
represented an important step for opponents of affirmative action. Powell’s 
view of Alan Bakke reflected his agreement with the definition of “minority” 
status proposed by anti-affirmative-action activists—Bakke bore “no 
responsibility for whatever harm the beneficiaries of the special admissions
program are thought to have suffered.”109 Indeed, Bakke himself could soon
be (or already was) a member of a victimized minority.110 Remedial 
justifications for affirmative action did not make sense when one believed 
that minority status was ever-changing and that people of color had no 
special claim to it.
C. Reverse Discrimination: Opposition to Affirmative Action on the Right
Between 1961 and 1980, opponents of affirmative action often did not 
take issue with the basic premise that the State should work to address racial 
subordination by offering special, race-conscious assistance to the 
disadvantaged.111 Instead, opponents of affirmative action took issue with 
what “true” affirmative action entailed or who belonged to “true 
minorities.”112 By the early 1980s, however, the challenge posed by the 
movement against affirmative action had deepened. The anti-affirmative-
action movement of the 1980s firmly established itself as part of the political 
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right, and different claims against affirmative action took center stage.113
Instead of challenging the definition of “minority” status, opponents began 
stressing that affirmative action itself represented a pernicious form of
“reverse discrimination” against whites.114 For the first time, opponents of 
affirmative action denied the existence of racial subordination, and argued 
that racism no longer made a difference to American society.115 In a 
post-racial society, affirmative action became both unnecessary and 
discriminatory.
As the YAF involvement in Bakke would suggest, conservatives had 
opposed affirmative action for the better part of a decade. Since the early 
1970s, neoconservative commentators, such as Irving Kristol and Norman 
Podhoretz, had endorsed a vision of colorblind constitutionalism.116 Perhaps 
the most prominent conservative spokesman for colorblindness was Thomas 
Sowell, an African-American economist who pioneered arguments that 
affirmative action actually harmed the disadvantaged minorities it was 
intended to aid.117 Just the same, before the late 1970s, “[c]olorblind liberals 
were at the helm of anti-affirmative action efforts.”118
By the end of the decade, however, the involvement of the New Right 
in opposing affirmative action became more systematic, organized, and 
intense. Leaders of the New Right claimed to have risen from the ashes of 
the Watergate scandal and from concerns with the Nixon-Ford 
administration.119 One of the orchestrators of this movement was Paul 
Weyrich, a cofounder of the Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank, 
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and the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC), a group 
dedicated to electing social conservatives to Congress.120
Weyrich saw his mission as the creation of a grassroots, 
politically pragmatic Right, a complement to the intellectuals 
who had dominated conservatism. He explained to the press in 
November 1977: “Conservatives have been led by an 
intellectual movement but not a practical movement until now
. . . . We [now] talk about issues people care about, like gun 
control, abortion, taxes, and crime.”121
Weyrich’s organizations provided valuable training and money to 
fledgling New Right causes: by 1978, the CSFC and other conservative 
political action committees, including the National Conservative Political 
Action Committee (NCPAC), had raised more than $3.5 million for 
conservative candidates.122 While Weyrich provided political strategy for 
these groups, Richard Viguerie and his direct-mail organization offered 
lobbying and fundraising services.123
The New Right became interested in affirmative action as a “wedge”
issue partly because of its connection to busing and desegregation. 
Following the decision of Green v. County School Board of New Kent 
County124 in 1968, the Supreme Court and lower courts embraced busing as 
a tool used to desegregate schools.125 In 1971, the Nixon administration
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almost immediately made busing a political issue, forbidding use of federal 
funds for the purpose.126
By the mid-1970s, the antibusing movement had grown nationally. One 
related organization, the National Action Group, sponsored a constitutional 
amendment that would end “forced busing.”127 The movement remained the 
most visible in Boston, where racial violence exploded in 1974.128 In the 
next five years, busing-related fire bombings took place in East and South 
Boston.129 During a football game, two white students shot and paralyzed a 
black classmate.130 Major antibusing protests spread to cities like Chicago 
and Nashville.131
Racial prejudice certainly animated a good deal of antibusing activism. 
The movement’s arguments were broader, however. In Boston and Chicago, 
for example, protesters stressed their resentment of judicial tyranny132 and
of an ever larger and more interventionist federal government that used 
“white children . . . as pawns.”133 Many members of the antibusing
movement were often poor or working-class mothers who, as the New York 
Times put it in 1979, felt “that they [had] no control over their future and the 
future of their neighborhoods.”134
For the New Right, the connection between busing and affirmative 
action was obvious. Both involved the meddling of liberal bureaucrats who 
did not believe in the free market, who supported judicial activism, who did 
not respect parental rights, and who unnecessarily victimized white 
children.135 “Conservatives cannot become the dominant political force in 
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America,” Viguerie argued, “until we stress the issues of concern to ethnic 
and blue-collar Democrats, born-again Christians, and pro-life Catholics and 
Jews. Some of these are abortion, busing, pornography, traditional Biblical 
values, and quotas.”136
The New Right had political incentive to tie affirmative action to a larger 
conservative agenda. Significantly, in the mid-1970s, changes to party 
politics created a perfect opportunity for opponents of affirmative action to 
make their cause a core part of the New Right platform. In order to be 
effective, opponents of affirmative action had to work with allies in the 
Republican Party. At the same time, the Democratic Party firmed up its 
support for affirmative action, denying influence to groups such as the AJC 
that opposed some affirmative-action programs. 
In the early 1970s, it was far from clear that the Democratic Party would 
take this position. In 1975, the House of Representatives voted on proposed 
legislation sponsored by Representatives Henry Waxman (D-CA) and James 
Scheuer (D-NY), stating: “No person shall, on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, or sex, be excluded from or admitted to participation in, . . . 
or be subjected to discrimination under any program.”137 Between 1974 and 
1980, however, the positions of the Republican and Democratic Parties 
diverged. 
Whereas the 1980 Democratic platform asserted that “[a]n 
effective affirmative action program is an essential component 
of our commitment to expanding civil rights protections,” the 
Republican platform argued that “equal opportunity should 
not be jeopardized by bureaucratic regulations and decisions 
which rely on quotas, ratios, and numerical requirements to 
exclude some individuals in favor of others, thereby rendering 
such regulations and decisions inherently discriminatory.”138
By 1980, the New Right had also established a new central objection to 
affirmative action. Organizations like the AJC primarily contested the 
meaning of true affirmative action. The AJC had conceded that racial 
minorities deserved special assistance, nonetheless insisting that judging 
people exclusively by individual merit was both constitutionally necessary 
and effective in reducing the impact of past discrimination.139 During the 
Bakke litigation, white ethnic groups primarily challenged the definition of 
a deserving minority. 
By 1980, the New Right had rejected the need for any remedial program 
for any minority group. Instead, New Right activists argued that 
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affirmative-action programs themselves represented racist discrimination 
against whites. In this account, affirmative action was no longer necessary 
because “discrimination [had] been effectively abolished in this country.”140
At the same time, the New Right contended that the free market would 
address any remaining discrimination. By contrast, the wrongful 
“presumption” of affirmative action was “that the market will not, for the 
foreseeable future, operate fairly, and that racial equality requires the
brokerage of progressive-minded bureaucrats.”141
If racial discrimination was no longer a major issue, remedial programs 
for blacks represented racial discrimination against whites. As the National 
Review argued in 1986: 
Affirmative action, as it is currently being used, is quite simply 
wrong—wrong because it is anti-white. It seeks to wipe out 
the effects of past discrimination through . . . discrimination. 
A white male American would be justified in judging that the 
Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of reverse 
discrimination, has nullified the social contract.142
Between 1980 and 1987, the New Right worked to convince the Reagan 
administration to oppose affirmative action. Reagan had a long track record 
of opposing race-conscious remedies, and after his election, Edwin Meese 
III, one of Reagan’s chief advisors, encountered opposition to efforts to undo 
federal support for affirmative action. In May 1981, for example, one of 
Meese’s allies complained that “careerist ideologues in the Civil Rights 
Division [of the Justice Department]” had endorsed busing and pushed 
“through decisions adverse to Reagan policies.”143
Disagreement within the administration became news when Reagan 
made a statement at a press conference about United Steelworkers v. Weber,
a 1979 Title VII case in which the Supreme Court held that a white factory 
worker was not entitled to enroll in a training program for black workers set
up under a voluntary union-management agreement.144 When first asked 
about the case, Reagan had stated that he would approve of such programs 
so long as they were voluntary.145 Meese and other opponents of affirmative 
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action quickly acted to correct Reagan’s gaffe, and the White House issued 
a statement stressing Reagan’s belief that the case had been “wrongly 
decided.”146
The press conference made clear that civil-rights issues were a public
relations problem for the administration. But in the short term, Meese and 
his allies seemed to have their way without popularizing colorblindness 
claims. Between 1982 and 1983, the Reagan Justice Department submitted 
amicus briefs arguing that affirmative-action hiring programs in Memphis 
and Detroit were impermissibly discriminatory, and Reagan made three new 
appointments to the United States Commission on Civil Rights, undercutting 
opposition to his policies.147
After the 1984 election, however, new internal conflict emerged. In 
August 1985, Meese, the new attorney general, went to work behind the 
scenes pushing Reagan to endorse a new executive order ending racial set-
asides in hiring.148 That fall, Meese called a meeting to organize support for 
a full-scale retreat from federal involvement in affirmative action.149 During 
a heated exchange, Bill Brock, the secretary of labor in the Reagan 
administration, led a faction that favored leaving existing 
employment-related affirmative-action programs in place, arguing that these 
initiatives worked well and were necessary to demonstrate the 
administration’s concern about civil rights.150 When those at the meeting 
could not reach a consensus, those present produced an option paper 
outlining radically different strategies for dealing with affirmative action in 
hiring.151
In trying to popularize his positions on affirmative action, Meese took 
his case to the media. The claims he forged linked anxieties about reverse 
discrimination and antiwhite bias to constitutional arguments about the 
importance of original intent and anticlassification values.152 He linked 
affirmative action to de jure segregation, suggesting that “a new version of 
the separate-but-equal doctrine [was] being pushed upon us.”153 Meese 
primarily stressed that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
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Amendments made the Constitution “officially colorblind.”154 As he stated 
in a widely reported speech, “[t]he fact that discrimination occurred in the 
past provides no justification for engaging in discriminatory conduct.”155 By 
February 1986, Reagan took a clearer position, siding with Meese and 
calling for a colorblind society where nothing is to be done to or for anyone 
because of race.156
As Reva Siegel has shown, legal scholars, sociologists, and members of 
the Supreme Court had spotlighted anticlassification arguments since the
decision of Brown.157 Meese and Reagan fused these arguments with popular 
anxieties about antiwhite “discrimination” articulated by the New Right.158
The administration had developed claims against affirmative action that 
brought together the New Right’s arguments about reverse discrimination, 
judicial activism, and original intent.159
Between 1989 and 1994, Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas 
(nominated by Presidents Reagan and George H. W. Bush, respectively) 
emerged as strong defenders of this particular vision of colorblindness.160
In 1989, in City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co.,161 the Court struck down 
the Minority Business Utilization Plan adopted by the city of Richmond. The 
plan required at least 30 percent of prime subcontracts to be given to 
minority-owned business entities.162 Writing in concurrence, Scalia echoed 
Meese’s claims, stating that “benign racial quotas have individual 
victims.”163 Scalia conceded that, in American society, blacks had, in the 
past, “suffered discrimination immeasurably greater than any . . . other racial 
groups.”164 Nonetheless, racism and racial classifications no longer made 
enough of a difference to justify discrimination against whites. As Scalia 
explained,
Racial preferences appear to “even the score” (in some small 
degree) only if one embraces the proposition that our society 
is appropriately viewed as divided into races, making it right 
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that an injustice rendered in the past to a black man should be 
compensated for by discriminating against a white.165
Because racial prejudice against blacks was no longer institutionalized 
or widespread, Scalia suggested, colorblindness was fair to everyone, while 
race-conscious remedies represented discrimination against whites.166
Scalia made this point clearer in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, a 1995 
case involving federal statutory and regulatory incentives for contractors to 
award subcontracts to “socially and economically disadvantaged 
individuals.”167 Confirming that strict scrutiny applied to all racial 
classifications, Adarand held that racial preferences at issue could not stand 
without satisfying strict scrutiny.168 Scalia’s concurring opinion again 
endorsed a vision of colorblindness.169 In the absence of a contemporary 
racial hierarchy, Scalia argued, race-conscious remedies “reinforce[d] and 
preserve[d] for future mischief the way of thinking that produced race 
slavery, race privilege and race hatred.”170
Similar arguments for colorblindness dominated anti-affirmative-action 
activism throughout the 1990s. In this period, veterans from the Reagan and 
George H. W. Bush administrations formed highly organized, conservative, 
and professional organizations opposed to affirmative action. Organizations 
of this kind included the Center for Equal Opportunity (the Center), the 
Center for Individual Rights (CIR), and Judicial Watch, Inc. (JWI). 
The Center was founded in 1995 by Linda Chavez, the former head of 
the United States Commission on Civil Rights.171 Chavez led the Center 
along with Roger Clegg, a former Assistant Attorney General who served in 
the Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations.172 The Center set out to 
be a conservative think tank focused exclusively on racial issues, and its 
work reflected the influence of arguments against affirmative action forged 
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in the Reagan administration.173 Chavez stressed original-intent claims, 
reasoning: “The Constitution forbids discrimination on the basis of race. 
That includes reverse discrimination.”174 Clegg described himself as a victim 
of past reverse discrimination, and he stressed that it was “wrong to 
discriminate against people because of their skin color and their ancestors’ 
country of origin.”175
While the Center studied and criticized affirmative-action programs, the 
CIR was a single-issue, public-interest litigation group founded in 1989 by 
conservative attorneys Michael McDonald and Michael Greve.176 As early 
as 1996, the CIR won a constitutional challenge to the affirmative-action 
policy used by the University of Texas, and by the late 1990s, the group led 
a full-scale attack on affirmative action in higher education.177 McDonald 
particularly objected to claims that racial diversity was important to higher 
education.178 True diversity, he argued, came from one’s beliefs and 
experiences. By contrast, “[m]ulticulturalism [was] just people who look 
different but think the same.”179
A final group, JWI, was founded in 1994 by conservative attorney Larry 
Klayman.180 The group first attracted attention by virtue of its legal attacks 
on the Clinton administration in the 1990s.181 By the end of the decade, 
conservative attorney Clint Bolick took a leading role in JWI.182 Another 
former Reagan administration official, Bolick became a passionate opponent 
of affirmative action during his time interning at Senator Orrin Hatch’s (R-
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UT) office.183 During the litigation of Bakke, Bolick became convinced that 
Bakke was “a modern-day Rosa Parks.”184
Starting in the mid-1990s, the newly professionalized anti-affirmative-
action movement made its public debut. Perhaps its best-known efforts in 
this period involved campaigns for anti-affirmative-action initiatives in 
states like California.185 In 1996, Ward Connerly, an African-American 
member of the University of California board of regents, led the California 
campaign for Proposition 209, a measure prohibiting discrimination or 
preference on the basis of race.186 Connerly worked to launch similar 
campaigns in Colorado, Michigan, and Washington.187
By the end of the decade, the movement turned to the courts in 
advancing an attack on affirmative action in higher education. The CIR held 
a news conference in which it questioned the constitutionality of the 
admissions policies in place at many universities.188 The Center gathered 
data from schools regarding “grades and test scores as well as family 
income, graduation rates, and native language” and compiled state reports.189
The CIR, in turn, initiated lawsuits and created a handbook for applicants 
interested in suing universities that had adopted affirmative-action 
programs.190
Between 1999 and 2003, Judicial Watch, the CIR, and the Center 
stressed arguments formulated by conservatives in the late 1970s and 1980s 
for colorblind laws and policies.191 However, Grutter v. Bollinger marked a 
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turning point for opponents of race-conscious policies. Grutter came at the 
end of earlier struggles to challenge the legitimacy of affirmative action in 
court. The case involved a challenge to an affirmative-action program at the 
University of Michigan Law School.192 The law school’s admissions policy 
required consideration of a variety of factors, including an applicant’s test 
scores, grade point average, and “soft variables,” such as the quality of an 
applicant’s essay.193 The policy further made apparent that diversity was 
accorded “substantial weight” in the admissions process.194 While 
recognizing a broad range of diversity contributions, the policy reaffirmed 
the University’s commitment to “racial and ethnic diversity with special 
reference to the inclusion of students from groups which have been 
historically discriminated against.”195
Barbara Grutter, a white applicant, was denied admission to the law 
school and sued, alleging that the University had relied predominantly on 
race in rejecting her candidacy.196 Grutter forced the Court to revisit the 
diversity rationale for affirmative action articulated by Justice Powell in 
Bakke.197 Significantly, lower court opinions in the case shaped the strategies 
used by opponents of affirmative action. The United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit had relied heavily on Bakke in upholding the challenged 
admissions policy, concluding, among other things, that diversity was a 
compelling state interest.198
Opponents of affirmative action had to respond to this new focus on 
diversity. Already, however, affirmative-action opponents began 
questioning the coherence and accuracy of the State’s concept of race. A 
brief submitted by anti-affirmative-action scholars contended that ideas of 
diversity were “based on racial stereotyp[es]” and made it “permissible to 
use race as a proxy for experiences, outlooks, or ideas.”199
The CIR similarly contended that diversity reasoning assumed that 
members of a certain group were “particularly likely to have experiences or 
perspectives important to the Law School’s mission merely because of their 
membership in a particular racial or ethnic group.”200 Amici suggested that 
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the diversity rationale made little sense, since racial identity did not reflect 
a signature experience or perspective.201 An amicus brief submitted by Ward 
Connerly took this argument even further, explaining: “Diversity based on 
race is . . . meaningless given that Americans are increasingly multiracial 
and no one student can be fairly said to be representative of their 
race . . . .”202
As we have seen, previous claims about colorblindness had presented 
race as a matter of skin color. The Grutter briefs, by contrast, portrayed race 
as a generalization that failed to capture the beliefs of individuals belonging 
to the group at issue. Connerly’s brief went further, suggesting that with the 
increase in the number of Americans identifying as multiracial, race itself 
might be a myth.
Grutter ultimately upheld the challenged policy, reasoning that the 
Equal Protection Clause did not prohibit narrowly tailored admission 
policies designed to achieve a compelling interest in diversity.203 After 
Grutter upheld Michigan’s program, the anti-affirmative-action movement 
continued its gradual retreat from the colorblindness arguments of the 
Reagan era. One new claim made in this period involved the supposed 
mismatch between the minority beneficiaries of affirmative-action programs 
and the universities to which they were admitted.204 As John O’Sullivan 
wrote in the National Review, affirmative-action programs “systematically 
mismatch minority talent to academic opportunities, placing the top 
10 percent of designated minority students into competition with the top 
1 percent of white and Asian students.”205 In this way, O’Sullivan contended 
that the beneficiaries of affirmative action were actually worse off than they 
would have been in programs to which they were better suited.206 Similarly, 
in the Supreme Court, anti-affirmative-action amici less often stressed 
anticlassification arguments, instead emphasizing that particular 
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race-conscious programs were not narrowly tailored enough to satisfy strict 
scrutiny.207
This shift was evident in 2006, in Parents Involved in Community 
Schools v. Seattle.208 The case involved voluntary integration plans adopted 
by school districts in Seattle and Louisville.209 In the Seattle plan, race 
served as a tiebreaker when desirable schools were oversubscribed.210
Louisville’s plan also allowed students to attend a preferred school until a 
particular institution “reached the ‘extremes of the racial guidelines,’” at 
which point the school district would assign students to different schools 
partly to achieve a more desirable racial balance.211
In a plurality opinion, the Parents Involved Court struck down both 
voluntary integration plans.212 At first, the opinion seems to be a strong 
endorsement of the colorblind Constitution. Chief Justice Roberts provided 
a clear articulation of the conventional colorblind view.213 As he explained, 
Brown recognized and mandated that the Court follow a colorblind 
approach.214 “[T]he position of the plaintiffs in Brown . . . could not have 
been clearer,” Roberts wrote.215 “[T]he Fourteenth Amendment prevents 
states from according differential treatment to American children on the 
basis of their color or race.”216 Significantly, in Roberts’s view, “it was that 
position that prevailed in this Court.”217
However, Justice Kennedy, the likely swing vote in future 
affirmative-action cases, distanced himself from the idea of a colorblind 
Constitution: “as an aspiration, [constitutional colorblindness] must 
command our assent. In the real world, it is regrettable to say, it cannot be a
universal constitutional principle.”218 Kennedy laid the foundation for future 
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opinions holding legitimate the “interest [the] government has in ensuring 
all people have equal opportunity regardless of their race.”219
Kennedy again zeroed in on the fit between the school districts’ ends 
and means. In Kennedy’s view, race-conscious remedies could “be 
considered legitimate only if they are a last resort to achieve a compelling 
interest.”220
Kennedy’s opinion laid a road map for opponents of affirmative action: 
activists could focus on schools’ failure to exhaust racially neutral strategies 
or to prove that less race-conscious methods could achieve a desired goal. 
In practice, this tactic could prove quite effective: schools would have to test 
and reject a long list of racially neutral strategies, and districts would face 
the difficult task of proving that a hypothetical alternative would not achieve 
a similar rate of integration.
Politically, however, Kennedy’s approach appears less promising for 
opponents of affirmative action. Narrow tailoring appears to be a technical 
question, whereas the idea of a colorblind Constitution is easy to convey and 
potentially resonant.221 If Kennedy’s approach shapes the Court’s future 
affirmative-action opinions, opponents of race-conscious programs will 
have to develop a politically powerful alternative to colorblindness claims.
Two of the Court’s recent racial decisions, Fisher II and Schuette,
showcase the alternatives developed by anti-affirmative-action activists.222
Rather than arguing for an abstract principle of colorblindness, these 
advocates question the workability of affirmative action. Borrowing from 
arguments made by historians and critical race theorists, opponents of 
affirmative action now suggest that the courts know nothing about what race 
means.
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE RACIAL INCOHERENCE ARGUMENT
If read in historical context, the dissenting opinions in Fisher II represent 
a turning point in attacks on affirmative action. To be sure, Fisher II invokes 
many of the most-familiar arguments against affirmative action. Justice 
Alito invokes the specter of racial quotas and the value of racial 
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colorblindness.223 However, Alito also embraces a tactic deployed in 
Supreme Court litigation since Fisher I, arguing that racial categories 
themselves are too incoherent to serve as the basis of any admissions 
policy.224
This plan of attack clearly debuted in the litigation of Fisher I, a 2013 
case involving an affirmative-action program at the University of Texas-
Austin.225 At that time, Texas relied on a two-tiered program of affirmative 
action—the product of years of litigation and experimentation.226 Earlier, in 
1996, in Hopwood v. Texas, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down 
a previously applicable race-conscious admissions plan at the University of 
Texas School of Law.227 The program divided students into three groups: 
presumptive admits, those in the discretionary zone, and presumptive 
rejects.228 A special admissions subcommittee dealt with minority 
candidates who fell in the discretionary zone and referred promising 
minority candidates to the full admissions committee.229 After the Hopwood 
court struck down this admissions program, the Texas Legislature passed the 
Top Ten Percent Law, requiring universities to admit the top ten percent of 
students from every high school in the state.230 Given the high rate of 
residential segregation in Texas, the plan tended to increase the admission 
of Hispanic and African-American applicants.231
After the decision of Grutter in 2003, the University also implemented 
a program that allowed for consideration of race or ethnicity as a factor 
relevant to the admissions process.232
Following a study on the subject, the University concluded that race or 
ethnicity could factor into a “personal achievement score,” a measurement 
of whether an applicant had confronted “special circumstances” or obstacles 
such as growing up in poverty or a single-parent home.233
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In a majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Fisher Court 
reversed and remanded a lower court opinion, reasoning that the Court of 
Appeals had not properly applied strict scrutiny in evaluating the Texas 
admissions policy.234 Fisher did not transform the law of affirmative action, 
but the case did mark the appearance of important new arguments against 
race-conscious remedies. Some opponents of affirmative action made 
familiar claims, contending that the University’s policy would fail true strict 
scrutiny because it failed to increase minority enrollment dramatically, 
because it was overinclusive, and because there was no strong basis in the 
evidence that the program was necessary to increase minority enrollment or 
access.235 Two important amicus briefs, submitted by the socially 
conservative American Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ) and Judicial 
Watch, Inc. (JWI), turned to a different line of argument. One brief asserted 
that even if diversity counted as a compelling governmental interest, “racial 
categories [were] arbitrary and . . . incoherent.”236 Racial classifications, as 
amici claimed, “[were], for the most part, sociopolitical, rather than 
biological, in nature.”237
JWI extensively quoted a statement made by the American 
Anthropological Association that “race evolved as a worldview, a group of 
prejudgments that distorts ideas about human differences and group 
behavior.”238 If racial categories had no scientific validity, and if race was a 
sociopolitical construct, then race-based preferences had to be inherently 
incoherent and wrong. As JWI contended in Fisher I: “Although science 
may have rejected race long ago, law and public policy, and in particular the 
University’s admission policy, have yet to catch up. It is time they did so.”239
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For JWI, the idea of race as a social construct first meant that racial 
categories are “inherently ambiguous.”240 Racial definitions could be 
cultural, personal, or genetic, the brief argues, and individual racial groups 
are maddeningly hard to define.241 Would an applicant from Azerbaijan be 
white or Asian? Who would decide the racial identity of mixed-race 
applicants? In asking these questions, JWI sought to establish that 
race-based preferences could not withstand strict scrutiny because race itself 
“cannot withstand a moment’s scrutiny.”242 The ACLJ echoed these claims, 
arguing that race-conscious affirmative action is “ultimately incoherent, as 
racial categories are both incoherent and porous.”243
In Schuette, several amicus briefs updated these arguments.244 A brief 
by UCLA professor and noted affirmative-action critic Richard Sander 
spotlighted changing understandings of race in modern America. As group 
identities multiplied and shifted, Sander argued that “the connection 
between these racial categories and underlying types of ‘disadvantage’ 
favored, or ‘diversity’ pursued, [became] more attenuated.”245 Sander 
focused on the impact of “a large and growing multi-racial population.”246
“By what rules is racial membership assigned?” Sander argued. “How does 
one prevent opportunistic behavior by self-classifying applicants?”247
The new anti-affirmative-action argument questioned both the 
workability and fairness of racial-preference programs. If some Americans
do not belong to any racial category, or fit within more than one, then 
someone will have to decide which individuals qualify for assistance.248 If 
individuals can select their own racial identity, as Sander suggested, there 
seems to be no natural check on self-interested behavior.249 If courts have to 
determine racial identity, the argument goes, then affirmative-action 
programs will enlist courts in a process that will reinforce—and rely upon—
largely empty racial categories.
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A. Schuette’s Definition of Race
Racial-construct arguments played an important, if subtle part, in the 
disposition of Schuette.250 The case involved a challenge to Article I, Section
26 of the Michigan Constitution, which prohibited any university or school 
district from “discriminat[ing] against, or grant[ing] preferential treatment 
to, any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or 
national origin.”251 Joined by the Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 
Integration, and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN), a group of students, faculty, and prospective applicants 
argued that Section 26 ran afoul of the political-process doctrine articulated 
by the Supreme Court in a line of cases decided in 1969 and 1982.252 The 
first such case, Hunter v. Erickson, addressed a city charter amendment in 
Akron, Ohio.253 The city had introduced a fair-housing law prohibiting racial 
discrimination, but voters amended the charter, requiring a referendum 
before a fair-housing law could be introduced.254 Because the charter 
amendment singled out fair-housing laws, Hunter found that the amendment 
“place[d] special burdens on racial minorities in the governmental process,” 
thereby violating the Constitution’s protections against racial 
discrimination.255
In 1982, the Court elaborated on the political-process doctrine in 
Washington v. Seattle School District.256 There, the Court dealt with a local 
school board decision to introduce busing.257 Voters statewide responded 
with an initiative banning busing.258 For the Court, the initiative raised the 
same constitutional concerns as the amendment addressed in Hunter: it 
“remove[d] the authority to address a racial problem—and only a racial 
problem—from the existing decisionmaking [sic] body, in such a way as to 
burden minority interests.”259
BAMN and the Sixth Circuit read Hunter and Seattle to stand for a 
broader proposition: if a policy “‘inure[d] primarily to the benefit of a 
minority’ . . . then any state action that ‘place[s] effective decisionmaking 
[sic] authority over’ that policy ‘at a different level of government’” required 
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strict scrutiny.260 In a plurality opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that this broader reading of Hunter and Seattle relied on an 
untenable and unfair definition of race.261 Kennedy explained that to know 
whether a law inured primarily to the benefit of a minority, the courts would 
have to make sense of who was—and was not—a member of that 
minority.262 “Were courts to embark on this venture,” Kennedy explained, 
“not only would it be undertaken with no clear legal standards or accepted 
sources to guide judicial decision[,] but also it would result in, or at least 
impose a high risk of, inquiries and categories dependent upon demeaning 
stereotypes.”263
Kennedy also echoed amici’s anxieties about the self-seeking behavior 
made possible by fluid racial categories. The plurality explained that 
adopting a broad interpretation of Seattle/Hunter would create “incentives 
for those who support or oppose certain policies to cast the debate in terms 
of racial advantage or disadvantage.”264 The plurality could imagine a kind 
of opportunism with few limits: groups could claim a racial disadvantage to 
manipulate “[t]ax policy, housing subsidies, wage regulations, and even the 
naming of public schools.”265
Concerns about racial construction and racial opportunism also shaped 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence.266 While the plurality preserved a narrow 
reading of Hunter and Seattle, Scalia called for them to be overruled, and he 
did so partly by relying on the problems created by courts deciding what race 
means.267 Scalia’s concurrence foregrounds “the dirty business of dividing 
the Nation into ‘racial blocs.’”268
For Scalia, racial definition presents two independent problems. First, 
courts would have to identify an individual’s race correctly—an exercise, 
Scalia writes, that is “as difficult as it is unappealing.”269 Like the plurality, 
Scalia put mixed-race individuals center stage. “Does a half-Latino, half-
American Indian,” Scalia asks, “have Latino interests, American-Indian 
interests, both, half of both?”270 Second, racial identification would rely on 
disturbing—and for Scalia, unconstitutional—assumptions that race means 
something. To understand whether a policy advances a minority interest, a 
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court would have to believe that minority members, whoever they are, have 
something in common. For Scalia, “such ‘racial stereotyping [is] at odds 
with equal protection mandates.’”271
Together with Scalia’s concurrence, the Schuette plurality departs from 
earlier attacks on affirmative action. The debate on a colorblind Constitution 
turns mostly on questions of principle and philosophy. Do equality mandates 
require formally equal—or identical—treatment? Or does equality 
sometimes require different treatment to address past subordination? 
Schuette operates at a different level. Schuette reasons that regardless of how 
one defines racial inequality, affirmative action would require the courts to 
label individuals by race and to know what race means.272 Drawing courts 
into the process of racial categorization would reinforce racial categories, 
strengthen racial stereotyping, encourage self-seeking behavior, and offer no 
guarantee that affirmative action would help those actually suffering the 
effects of past subordination.273
B. The Meaning of Race in Fisher II
The Court’s decision in Fisher II shows the battle lines now drawn in 
conflict about affirmative action. Justice Kennedy’s majority confirms the 
legitimacy of university policies designed to increase diversity and leaves 
administrators some latitude to consider race.274 Justice Alito’s dissent 
suggests that the racial categories used to define diversity are vague, 
anachronistic, and hopelessly flawed.275 Whether an affirmative-action 
policy is constitutional, it seems, will depend on the validity of racial 
categories.
The fault line running through Fisher II began to surface when the 
Fisher I Court remanded to the Fifth Circuit to consider whether the Texas 
policy survived strict scrutiny.276 There, Fisher urged the court to strike 
down the policy because it had only “a de minimis effect” on diversity in the 
                                                                                                                         
271 Id. at 1643–44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995)).
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273 See id. at 1643–44 (Scalia, J., concurring) (explaining that “no good can come of such random 
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276 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 637 (5th Cir. 2014), aff’d, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) 
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school.277 Before UT Austin adopted a race-conscious policy, the University 
already had reached a rate of over 21 percent by relying on the Top Ten 
Percent Plan, and a race-conscious plan reportedly increased 
African-American enrollment by less than 1 percent.278
The majority rejected this “truncate[d]” approach to strict scrutiny.279
Seizing on language from Grutter mandating holistic, individualized review, 
the court concluded that the University realistically could have concluded 
that a percentage-based approach alone was not enough.280 Nor did the 
University do too little to explore race-neutral options.281 The majority 
detailed steps taken by the University to increase diversity without explicitly 
considering race, including scholarship and outreach efforts.282 Because 
African-American and Hispanic enrollment had declined notwithstanding 
these efforts, as the court reasoned, the University justifiably looked beyond 
the Top Ten Percent Plan.283
The court also highlighted supposed weaknesses of the Top Ten Percent 
Plan.284 The scheme achieved diversity by admitting students with 
disproportionately low standardized test scores.285 Only by adding holistic 
review could the University “reach a pool of minority and non-minority 
students with records of personal achievement.”286 In this analysis, diversity 
included more than race.287 For the majority, the University’s plan satisfied 
strict scrutiny.288
Writing in dissent, Judge Garza concluded that the University’s goals 
and strategies for achieving those ends were too vague to satisfy strict 
                                                                                                                         
277 Id. at 645.
278 Id. at 644–45.
279 Id. at 645.
280 See id. at 647 (“Given the test score gaps between minority and non-minority applicants, if 
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including those that stem from race, holistic admissions would approach an all-white enterprise.”). 
281 Id. at 649.
282 Id. at 647–49.
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286 Id. at 653.
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not only skin color but a “range of skills, experiences, and performances”).
288 See id. (affirming summary judgment in favor of the University).
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scrutiny.289 Garza faulted the University for failing to define what would 
count as a critical mass of diverse students or to explain why race-conscious 
measures were needed to achieve the University’s ends.290
Both the majority and dissent in Fisher II rely on familiar racial 
categories.291 Some of the briefs submitted in support of Fisher’s certiorari 
petition repeated conventional arguments about the stigmatic harms tied to 
race and the imprecision of the University’s means and ends.292 However, 
opponents of affirmative action treated the case as an opportunity to begin 
what Schuette started—the wholesale rejection of race as a concept. “Human 
race and ethnicity are ambiguous social constructs that have no validity in 
science,” JWI wrote in its amicus brief in Fisher II.293 Any policy relying on 
“crude, inherently ambiguous, and arbitrary racial and ethnic categories . . .
can never be narrowly tailored.”294
C. The Battle Over Racial Categories in Fisher II
While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Fisher II did not squarely 
address the legitimacy of racial categories, the Court’s reasoning assumes 
that administrators can identify students by race and under certain limited 
circumstances, achieve valuable classroom diversity by doing so. By 
contrast, in explaining why Texas’s program fails strict scrutiny, the 
dissenting justices rejected the idea of racial categories out of hand.295
The Fisher II majority came closest to analyzing the value of racial 
categories in evaluating Abigail Fisher’s arguments against the University’s 
admission policy.296 First, Fisher argued that Texas could not satisfy strict 
scrutiny because administrators had not defined their goal, achieving a 
“critical mass” of diverse students, with enough clarity.297 The majority 
understood Fisher’s argument to involve numerical clarity—that is, Texas 
                                                                                                                         
289 Id. at 661–62 (Garza, J., dissenting).
290 Id. at 667–68.
291 See id. at 656–57, 669 (discussing the different backgrounds and stereotypes related to minority 
students).
292 Brief for the Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5-8, Fisher v. Univ. of 
Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–981) (arguing the university pursued not diversity 
but racial quotas); Amicus Curiae Brief for the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence at 2–10, Fisher 
v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–981) (relying primarily on conventional 
colorblindness arguments in condemning the university’s policy).
293 Brief of Amici Curiae of Judicial Watch, Inc., & Allied Educational Foundation in Support of 
Petitioner at 2, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (No. 14–981).
294 Id. at 3.
295 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2215, 2220–26 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(noting that Texas’s justification was too broad). 
296 See id. at 2210–13 (outlining the Petitioner’s four main arguments and the Court’s response to 
them).
297 Id. at 2210. 
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had implied a numerical goal without limits.298 However, Fisher’s argument 
also implied a second form of ambiguity surrounding Texas’s goal. How 
would the University know that individual students qualified as sufficiently 
diverse to create a critical mass? 
In rejecting the need for any hard number defining a critical mass, Fisher 
II suggested that racial categories can have value to administrators as a 
means of reaping the “educational benefits that flow from student body 
diversity.”299 Describing the process by which Texas arrived at a “reasoned, 
principled explanation,” the majority confirmed that universities could seek 
to “promot[e] cross-racial understanding” and prepare students for “an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society.”300
These goals would lose value if racial categories themselves made no 
sense. How could a university promote understanding between students of 
different races if race itself was an arbitrary fiction? In that case, what kind 
of understanding could students gain? And if racial categories are artificial 
constructs, how could the university prepare students for a more diverse 
workforce by adopting race-conscious policies? If racial categories have less 
and less meaning, would a university not better prepare students for a diverse 
workforce by jettisoning race-conscious policies? The majority implies its 
answer to these questions in its analysis of Texas’s goals. If cross-racial 
understanding and preparation for a diverse workforce are principled goals, 
the majority sees the possibility of racial categories having some inherent 
worth.301
The remainder of the majority opinion bolsters this understanding of 
racial categories. Fisher argued that any race-conscious policy was 
unnecessary because Texas had already achieved a “critical mass” through 
its Top Ten Percent Plan and because “race-neutral holistic review” had 
made only a minimal difference.302 In refuting Fisher’s critical-mass 
argument, the majority walked through empirical and anecdotal evidence 
documenting the experience and admission rates of “African-American,” 
“Hispanic,” and “Asian” applicants.303 The validity of these categories is at 
the center of the Court’s analysis of a critical mass.304
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299 Id. at 2210 (quoting Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013)).
300 Id. at 2211.
301 See id. at 2210–12 (“‘The use of race-neutral policies and programs ha[d] not been successful’ 
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The Court relied on the same racial categories in explaining that Texas’s 
holistic review had a “meaningful, if still limited, effect on the diversity of 
the University’s freshman class.”305 Even the Court’s analysis of Fisher’s 
final suggestion—that Texas admit all diverse students through a percentage 
plan—assumed that race was a real, identifiable thing.306 The majority 
rejected Fisher’s proposal because it would “sacrifice all other aspects of 
diversity in pursuit of enrolling a higher number of minority students.”307
The Court compared racial identities to other, unquestionably real 
experiences or traits. A racially diverse student could be as readily identified 
as a “star athlete or musician” or a “talented young biologist.”308
The dissenting justices took a dramatically different position on the 
validity of racial categories. Justice Alito’s dissent began in familiar 
territory, reiterating that “[d]istinctions between citizens based solely on 
their ancestry are by their nature odious to a free people.”309 Alito also 
accepted Fisher’s argument that Texas had not defined “critical mass”
clearly enough.310 By accepting the Texas’ “self-serving” explanation of its 
own goals, as Alito saw it, the majority deferred far more to administrators 
than strict-scrutiny review would permit.311
When explaining that Texas’s admissions plan was not narrowly 
tailored, Alito’s dissent took a new direction. The dissenting justices adopted 
arguments about the incoherence of racial categories championed for some 
time by opponents of affirmative action. Alito began by noting that Texas’s 
policy “discriminate[d] against Asian-Americans.”312 Alito took Texas to 
task for favoring some minority groups over others, but his dissent more 
heavily criticized Texas’s use of “crude, overly simplistic racial . . .
categories.”313 Returning to the “Asian-American” category, Alito mocked 
Texas’s definition of race, noting that the Asian category covered “60% of 
the world’s population.”314 “It would be ludicrous,” Alito wrote, “to suggest 
that all of these students have similar backgrounds and similar ideas and 
experiences to share.”315
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Alito then directly attacked the very idea of a racial category.316 Noting
that Texas had never defined who belonged in each of the five categories 
used in its admission policy, Alito borrowed directly from arguments made 
by opponents of affirmative action.317 He reasoned that mixed-race students, 
many of whom claimed ancestry from several of the categories Texas used, 
would soon make any clean definition of race deeply problematic.318 How, 
in a post-racial world, could Texas know when a student would have “a 
distinctive perspective or set of experiences associated with [a particular] 
group?”319
Alito also invoked the specter of self-serving behavior of which 
opponents of affirmative action had warned.320 If it was no longer possible 
to coherently define racial categories, Texas had to rely on students to claim 
a racial identity for themselves.321 “This,” Alito wrote, “is an invitation for 
applicants to game the system.”322
The Court’s opinion showcases where the war over affirmative action is 
headed. Proponents of affirmative action will have to respond to opposition 
arguments about the ambiguity and instability of race. Part III next considers 
one strategy for addressing this new attack on affirmative action.
III. THE PROMISE OF “REGARDED-AS” REASONING
The problem, of course, is that racial thinking shapes individual 
experience and outcomes, regardless of the biological validity of racial 
categories. Individual background, in turn, can determine others’ 
perceptions of race. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of 
Youth (NLSY), a recent study conducted by Professors Aliya Saperstein and 
Andrew Penner found that changes in individual economic circumstances 
affected how interviewers defined a person’s race: interviewers more often 
identified a subject as a minority when she was unemployed, facing criminal 
charges, or otherwise struggling.323 In another study, Saperstein and her 
colleagues explored how funeral directors categorized those who had passed 
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away.324 Again, economic and other life circumstances determined the 
outcome: people who had been murdered were categorized as African
American, even when loved ones had identified the deceased as belonging 
to another race.325 As these studies make apparent, economic and social 
stereotypes still mark our perceptions of one another. Proxies for race, 
including class, criminal history, and place of residence, all help to 
determine how an individual is categorized.
These stereotypes also make a significant difference in individuals’ 
lives. Research by Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan found a 50-
percent gap in callbacks for those with stereotypically “black” names on 
their resumes compared to those with stereotypically white names.326 This 
effect applied regardless of the “real” race of an applicant—an individual’s 
name brought to mind race and all it represented for many prospective 
employers.327 Professors Douglas Massey and Garvey Lundy found a similar 
effect when measuring the ability of fictitious prospective tenants to get 
through to a rental agent.328 Study subjects spoke on the phone using either 
White Middle Class English, Black English Vernacular, or Black Accented 
English.329 Race, sex, and class—determined by speech alone—helped to 
dictate an individual’s access to a landlord and to a rental unit.330 For 
example, the study found that 87 percent of white males were able to get 
through to a rental agent, compared with only 63 percent of females speaking 
in Black English Vernacular.331
The skepticism about racial definitions expressed by Fisher II offers no 
guidance for how to deal with the difference made by perceptions of race, 
however inaccurate.332 If racial categories are totally incoherent, and 
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individuals (particularly mixed-race ones) have no “real” race, then the 
colorblindness paradigm will need reworking. As scholars often recognize, 
the courts often use “color” and “race” synonymously, treating both as 
biological labels rather than as social constructs.333 For example, under the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, the courts use skin color or 
other salient physical features as shorthand for membership in a particular 
group.334 To know if someone has suffered racial discrimination, the final 
prong of McDonnell Douglas often requires courts to decide whether an 
individual was treated differently than similarly situated employees.335 If 
that employee was replaced by someone of the same race—defined by the 
person’s physical traits—then discrimination becomes much harder to 
prove.336 Even in Fourteenth Amendment cases, to make sense of the idea 
that someone suffered discrimination “because of race” logically requires a 
court to know what race that person was or was perceived to be.
How, then, should courts address the dangers of racial categorization 
foregrounded in Schuette and Fisher II,337 and emphasized by 
affirmative-action opponents, without ignoring the reality of racial 
stereotyping in modern America? This Article suggests that courts should 
look at an established body of law addressing whether a worker is “regarded 
as” belonging to a disfavored group. Most developed in the context of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, “regarded-as” cases get at the root of the 
problem with racial stereotyping.338 If personal circumstances determine 
how one’s race is defined, and if racial stereotypes can dictate certain 
individual outcomes, then what matters to the law of affirmative action 
should be how relevant decision makers perceive race to be. 
Using “regarded-as” cases as a starting point also helps to address some 
of the problems raised by Schuette and Fisher II. Together with a handful of 
cases decided under Title VII, this body of law could provide badly needed 
guidance for courts forced to determine whether or not an individual was 
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judged because of race. Without adjudicating that person’s identity or 
reaffirming racial categories, courts could return to a relatively familiar 
question involving how that person was perceived. As importantly, as 
Angela Onwuachi-Willig and Mario Barnes have argued, “regarded-as” 
cases recognize the harm individuals experience because of negative, and 
often inaccurate, stereotypes.339
But how would regarded-as reasoning apply in the dramatically different 
context of postsecondary admissions? Whereas race can make it harder for 
workers to get or keep a job, university affirmative-action programs treat 
race as a plus, and applicants often identify themselves, thereby increasing 
the chances of self-serving behavior. Moreover, the kind of evidence central 
to employment cases seems inapplicable in the context of admissions, where 
officers often rely on the content of a written application. 
However, as the official guidance issued by the Departments of 
Education and Justice suggests, some admissions officers likely already rely 
on regarded-as reasoning.340 Because the Court’s recent affirmative-action 
decisions allow for race-conscious remedies only as a measure of last 
resort,341 admissions officers seem to fall back on proxies thought to identify 
minorities. Regarded-as reasoning allows admissions officers to comply 
with the Court’s mandate. 
By explicitly recognizing the way in which racial identification often 
operates, the Court can address the problem affirmative action opponents 
raised in Schuette and Fisher II. Focusing on a person’s perceived race—
rather than on skin color or any other pseudobiological category—would 
create a jurisprudence that better reflects the fluidity and 
context-dependence with which outsiders, and sometimes individuals 
themselves, perceive racial identity. Far from ignoring the dangers of racial 
classification, regarded-as case reasoning would take them head on.
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A. The “Regarded-As” Standard under the ADA, the ADAAA, and Title VII
In 1990, with the passage of the ADA, Congress seemed intent on 
including those perceived as disabled within the protections of the law.342 A
House Report stated: 
In the employment context, if a person is disqualified on the 
basis of an actual or perceived physical or mental condition, 
and the employer can articulate no legitimate job-related 
reason for the rejection, a perceived concern about employing 
persons with disabilities would be inferred and the plaintiff 
would qualify for coverage under the “regarded as” test.343
Following the passage of the ADA, the EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance 
similarly covered those regarded as disabled: 
An individual rejected from a job because of the ‘myths, fears 
and stereotypes’ associated with disabilities would be covered 
under this part of the definition of disability . . . whether or not 
the individual’s actual physical or mental condition would be 
considered a disability under the first or second part of this 
definition.344
According to the Interpretive Guidance, an individual proceeding under 
this theory would have to show that an employer believed that a worker was 
disabled because of “myths, fears, or stereotypes.”345 After the courts 
restricted relief for those perceived as disabled, the Americans with 
Disabilities Act Amendments Act (ADAAA) clarified the definition of 
disability.346 Under the ADAAA, a person meets the regarded-as prong “if 
the individual establishes that he or she has been subjected to an action 
prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or 
mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to 
limit a major life activity.”347
A handful of cases have developed a doctrinal framework for the 
ADAAA’s regarded-as prong. In Hilton v. Wright, a former state prisoner 
suffering from the Hepatitis-C Virus brought suit with several other inmates 
allegedly denied antiviral treatments because of past alcoholism or drug 
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abuse.348 Hilton argued that the Department of Correctional Services 
(DOCS) discriminated against him and others similarly situated because 
they were regarded as disabled.349
In addressing Hilton’s claim, the Second Circuit elaborated on the 
standard for a regarded-as suit under the ADAAA.350 At least at the summary 
judgment stage, Hilton would have to bring forth evidence only that DOCS 
regarded him as having a physical or mental impairment, regardless of how 
severe they believed that impairment to be.351
Several courts have also fleshed out what might count as evidence that 
an employer regarded an individual as disabled. In Gil v. Vortex, L.L.C., the 
court rejected the defendant-employer’s motion to dismiss the employee’s 
disability-discrimination claim.352 The court found evidence that the 
employer regarded the plaintiff as disabled when the employer required the 
plaintiff to submit additional medical documentation, expressed concern 
about the plaintiff’s disability when talking to his daughter, and required the 
plaintiff to submit to tests not applicable to any other employee.353 In 
addition to differential treatment, courts look at an employer’s comments as 
evidence that a worker was regarded as disabled.354 Consider, for example, 
Darcy v. City of New York, in which the plaintiff, a police officer, brought a 
disability-discrimination claim based on his superiors’ belief that he was an 
alcoholic.355 In rejecting the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court relied on evidence that an employer had called the plaintiff an 
alcoholic, knew he associated with supposed alcoholics, and transferred him 
to a less desirable position five months later.356 Consistently, when deciding 
cases under the ADAAA, courts have not required proof that an individual 
actually had an impairment. In other words, courts do not have to determine 
either how serious an employer believed a disability to be, or whether a 
worker suffered from a disability at all.
To a limited extent, the courts have imported the regarded-as standard 
into race-discrimination cases. The EEOC has consistently maintained that 
misperception should not be a defense to either race or national origin 
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discrimination.357 The EEOC Compliance Manual prohibits race 
discrimination, including
discrimination against an individual based on a belief that the 
individual is a member of a particular racial group, regardless 
of how the individual identifies himself. Discrimination 
against an individual based on a perception of his or her race 
violates Title VII even if that perception is wrong.358
While some federal circuit courts treat misperception as a defense,359
others follow the EEOC in concluding that those regarded as minorities 
suffer real harm. Consider the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in EEOC v. 
WC&M Enterprises.360 Mohammed Rafiq, a practicing Muslim from India, 
found his workplace dramatically different in the aftermath of September 
11, 2001.361 In addition to making comments on Rafiq’s religion, his 
coworkers repeatedly called him “an Arab” and a “Taliban.”362 Rafiq
suffered because coworkers regarded him as Arab, treating religion as a 
proxy for national origin and ethnicity.
Rafiq filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, which later 
brought a hostile work environment claim on Rafiq’s behalf.363 The district 
court had rejected Rafiq’s national-origin discrimination claim, reasoning 
that no one had targeted Rafiq for being from India.364 Relying on the 
EEOC’s Guidance, the Fifth Circuit disagreed, suggesting that the hostility 
a worker faces is just as substantial in cases of misperception.365 As the court 
explained: “[A] party is able to establish a discrimination claim based on its 
own national origin even though the discriminatory acts do not identify the 
victim’s actual country of origin.”366
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In Jones v. UPS Ground Freight, the Eleventh Circuit similarly 
recognized the harm of racial misperception.367 Jones, who identified as 
African-American, began training for a road driver position.368 Jones’s
race-discrimination argument relied partly on statements made by his 
co-worker, Kenneth Terrell, during a week-long training session.369 At that 
time, Terrell told Jones: “I know how to train you Indians.”370 When Jones 
responded that he was not Indian, Terrell replied: “I don’t care what race 
you are, I trained your kind before.”371 Terrell went on to call Jones an 
“Indian” several more times over the course of the conversation.372
In evaluating Jones’ hostile work environment claim, the Eleventh 
Circuit considered how much weight to attach to Terrell’s statements, 
particularly since he had misidentified Jones.373 While recognizing that 
Jones was “neither Native American nor Indian,” the court insisted that “a 
harasser’s use of epithets associated with a different ethnic or racial minority 
than the plaintiff will not necessarily shield an employer from liability for a 
hostile work environment.”374 Whatever stereotypes Terrell applied to 
Indians may well have affected Jones, regardless of how he categorized 
himself. “The fact that [a co-worker] ignorantly used the wrong derogatory 
ethnic remark toward the plaintiff,” the court reasoned, “is 
inconsequential.”375
The Ninth Circuit stated the rationale for rejecting a 
racial-misperception defense in Amos v. City of Page Arizona.376 There, 
Burton Amos got in a car accident, crossing the center line and colliding 
with another vehicle.377 Informed that Amos had exited his vehicle and likely 
suffered from serious injuries, the police conducted a brief search before 
their flashlight batteries died.378 The police did not look for Amos again for 
more than a month.379 Tourists would ultimately find Burton’s remains one 
year later.380 Representatives from Burton’s estate learned that law 
enforcement routinely waited to conduct searches nearby, since the area 
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where Burton vanished bordered the Navajo Indian Reservation.381 Burton 
was white, but his perceived race seems to have dictated the officers’ 
actions.382 Believing that Native Americans involved in car accidents often 
fled the scene, reached the reservation, and called in the next day, officers 
might have cut short the search for Burton based on a mistaken belief about 
his ethnicity.383 Burton’s estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that 
law enforcement “violated the Equal Protection Clause by selectively 
withholding protective services” based on his perceived ethnicity.384
The City argued that Amos’s Estate had no standing to bring a claim 
because Amos was white and did not belong to the class of persons that the 
City had stereotyped or mistreated.385 The lower court had adopted this 
reasoning in dismissing the Estate’s equal protection claim, reasoning that 
antidiscrimination protections help to rectify the effects of past 
subordination that Amos, a white man, likely never experienced.386 The
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, relying on the harms Amos suffered 
because of his perceived identity.387 First, the court recognized that the 
consequences for Amos did not change because he was white, and the injury 
he suffered was no less real.388 Stereotyping, the court recognized, was just 
as malevolent when an actor chose the “wrong” victim.389
Taken together, Amos, Jones, and WC & M Enterprises reveal that 
regarded-as discrimination cuts across racial lines, affecting those who 
identify as minorities and those who do not. These cases show how racial 
proxies and stereotypes influence how individuals perceive, judge, and treat 
one another. These cases bolster the case for separating the stereotypes 
associated with race from skin color. Regardless of how a person categorizes 
herself, the judgments and generalizations associated with perceived race 
can do far-reaching harm.
But how can the courts translate regarded-as reasoning in the context of 
postsecondary admissions? Exploring admissions officers’ efforts to comply 
with the Supreme Court’s affirmative-action jurisprudence illuminates one 
potentially constructive answer to this question.  
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B. Race, Regarded-As Reasoning, and Affirmative Action
Almost inevitably, the courts will soon address the question dividing the 
Court in Fisher II: whether the race-conscious remedies discussed in Grutter 
v. Bollinger and Parents Involved v. Seattle can ever pass constitutional 
muster in a world in which racial identity is socially constructed and 
ever-changing. How can the courts justify any antisubordination measure 
designed to protect the members of a particular race when it is impossible to 
offer a principled definition of race itself?
Drawing on the ADAAA, courts should view affirmative action as 
justified and coherent when an individual is regarded as belonging to a 
particular race. As under the ADAAA, the question should not be whether 
that person actually has a particular racial background or even whether a 
decision maker views that racial background negatively. Instead, the 
analysis should turn on simple perception of race. 
However, using regarded-as reasoning in the context of postsecondary 
admissions raises unique challenges. In the employment context, as Bertrand 
and Mullainathan have shown, perceived racial identity can count as a strike 
against a potential hire or worker.390 By contrast, in postsecondary 
education, many admission officers view minority status favorably. In 
studying admissions practices at seventy-five of the nation’s most 
competitive universities, scholar Rachel Rubin found that most admissions 
officers heavily weighed an applicant’s “fit” with the university in 
question.391 When asked to define fit, officers attached the most importance 
to an applicant’s membership in an underrepresented minority.392 Rubin’s 
conclusions reinforce the findings of earlier studies, explaining that 
members of underrepresented minorities (along with legacy students and 
those with SAT scores higher than 1500) receive the greatest preference.393
Moreover, in the university setting, because applicants often identify 
themselves by race, the odds of opportunistic behavior are higher.394 In the 
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workplace, employers cannot select workers by race or even ask about the 
identity of a potential hire.395 Because students have more control over the 
process of racial categorization, the risk of self-serving behavior is naturally 
higher.
Finally, the evidentiary strategies used in ADAAA and race 
discrimination cases seem to be a poor fit in the context of university 
admissions. In employment cases, courts rely on off-color comments, 
adverse employment actions, and comparator evidence to smoke out 
regarded-as discrimination.396 Given the confidentiality surrounding 
university admissions and the different ways in which applicants categorize 
themselves by race, this kind of evidence seems unlikely to surface.
However, the United States Departments of Education and Justice’s 
Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race in Postsecondary Admissions (the 
Guidance) suggests that some universities have already adopted regarded-as
reasoning.397 Under Grutter, Parents Involved, and their progeny, as the 
Guidance asserts, universities must first justify why diversity counts as a 
compelling state interest.398
Centrally, however, the Guidance addresses how to create a diverse 
student body without recourse to racial categorization. The Guidance 
encourages admissions officers to turn first to race-neutral alternatives to 
achieve obviously race-conscious outcomes. “In selecting among 
race-neutral approaches,” the Guidance explains, “you may take into 
account the racial impact of various choices.”399 The Guidance next explores 
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how admissions officers might identify minority applicants without turning 
to racial categories. Rather than explicitly asking about race, as the Guidance
states, universities may rely on proxies, including “socioeconomic status,” 
“the educational level attained by parents,” “first-generation college status,” 
“marked residential instability,” or “enrollment in a low-performing school 
or district.”400 While officially race-neutral, these criteria allow officers to 
identify applicants they regard as minorities. The Guidance treats these 
proxies as strategies that “would assist in drawing students from different 
racial backgrounds to the institution.”401
Most obviously, regarded-as reasoning allows universities invested in 
racial diversity to proceed in spite of the Court’s decisions in Grutter,
Parents Involved, and Fisher I and II. In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion reminded universities that to satisfy strict scrutiny, “[t]he 
reviewing court must ultimately be satisfied that no workable race-neutral 
alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”402 Using 
race-neutral proxies appears to allow admissions officers to achieve a 
desired result without resorting to racial categorization.
In defining race, the courts should look to how admissions officers 
identify students. By acknowledging and analyzing the way in which 
admissions officers deal with students’ race, the Court can better capture the 
reality of racial identity, both as college applicants experience it and 
admissions officers perceive it. As Saperstein and Penner have shown, 
outsiders’ perception of another’s racial identity—and even an individual’s 
understanding of herself—varies depending on the surrounding 
circumstances.403 And as Bertrand and Mullainathan indicate, the 
stereotypes and judgments surrounding race do damage regardless of a 
person’s “true” identity.404
Furthermore, if the Court relies on evidence of a person’s perceived 
race, the risk of opportunism might decrease, since there is anecdotal 
evidence that admissions officers sometimes already use regarded-as
reasoning to detect and resist self-serving behavior. Rather than taking an 
applicant’s self-categorization at face value, admissions officers at Rice 
University “try to reconcile whatever boxes an applicant may have checked 
with the rest of the application.”405 Some admissions officers at Rice used a 
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specific essay question about “unique life experiences and cultural 
traditions” to filter out applicants who were insincere about a particular 
racial identity.406 Another former admissions officer interviewed by the 
Huffington Post explained that her colleagues had used proxies when 
students refused to answer questions about race, believing that officers 
discriminated against Asian or Caucasian applicants.407 In particular, she 
described how officers used a student’s name, parents’ name, or school of 
origin to determine racial identity.408 As this anecdotal evidence suggests, 
courts focusing on an individual’s perceived identity might more effectively 
check the kind of self-serving behavior that Schuette and the Fisher II 
dissenters foreground.
Nonetheless, in the university setting, regarded-as reasoning represents 
a far from perfect solution. Critics of Grutter and its progeny have long 
insisted that the Court’s approach to diversity encourages universities to 
conceal their true objectives.409 First, diversity jurisprudence encourages 
decision-makers to play down the remedial interest in addressing the effects 
of past race discrimination that likely motivates many admissions officers.410
By prohibiting quotas and other quantitative approaches to affirmative 
action, the Court encourages officers to obscure how much race matters to
admissions decisions.411 By focusing on how admissions officers evaluate 
students’ racial identity, the Court can acknowledge the social construction 
of race while recognizing the ways in which perceived race impacts 
individual outcomes. However, at least in the affirmative-action context, 
regarded-as approaches to race seem to ratify admissions officers’ efforts to 
achieve a race-specific outcome without admitting their true intentions. To 
the extent that a regarded-as approach represents an effort to comply with 
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Grutter and its progeny, it may once again allow officers and courts to deny 
the extent to which racial categorization still drives admissions decisions.
Regarded-as approaches may also be over- or underinclusive, given a 
university’s genuine interest in diversity. First, by focusing on variables like 
socioeconomic class, such an approach may fail to capture the disadvantaged 
minority students that affirmative-action programs would ideally assist.412
As importantly, by failing to address all self-serving behavior, regarded-as 
approaches may give an unfair advantage to students more successfully able 
to simulate a favored racial identity. From the standpoint of individual 
students, regarded-as approaches ignore the importance of a student’s sense 
of identity. Regardless of whether or not it is constructed, racial identity can 
play a crucial role in how an individual sees herself and her place in the 
community.413 By relying so heavily on what outsiders think, regarded-as 
approaches do not do justice to students’ understandings of themselves. 
Just the same, regarded-as reasoning provides the best path for courts 
faced with a Hobson’s choice: categorizing individuals by race or rejecting 
all antisubordination remedies that touch on racial differences. Recognizing 
the impact of perceived racial differences allows courts to rationalize 
affirmative action policies without assuming the validity of racial categories. 
Should courts ever have to adjudicate race, in the context of affirmative 
action or otherwise, an existing (albeit developing) legal framework exists 
to provide guidance. 
Regarded-as reasoning may also work effectively to allow universities 
to address past subordination without running up against constitutional 
prohibitions on racial classifications. Recent work published by the Harvard 
Journal of Law and Policy studied the impact of a proxy program developed 
at the University of Colorado Boulder.414 Prior to 2009, the University used 
socioeconomic class instead of race in admissions decisions.415 By 2010, the 
University had turned to a race-plus-class model.416 A 2009 study found that 
officers admitted 9 percent more underrepresented minorities under the race-
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blind policy.417 In evaluating the race-plus-class approach, a 2010 study 
concluded that it had resulted in a 13-percent increase in acceptance rates 
for the poorest students, a 17-percent increase for underrepresented minority 
students, and a 32 percent-increase in the lowest-income, minority 
students.418 At least some well-tailored proxy programs may make a
significant difference to minority enrollment.
In spite of its drawbacks, regarded-as reasoning offers a promising 
solution for the dilemma outlined by affirmative-action opponents in Fisher 
II. By defining racial identity according to others’ perception, regarded-as
reasoning reduces the threat of opportunism or self-serving behavior. It 
captures the fact that racial proxies and all the stereotypes they represent 
matter more than color or biological race. In this way, the challenge raised 
by anti-affirmative-action advocates may create an unexpected new 
opportunity. From equal protection to Title VII jurisprudence, commentators 
have long faulted the courts for adopting a biological understanding of race 
that is inaccurate and misleading. Forcing cause lawyers and the courts to 
say what race means might finally provide a way forward.
CONCLUSION
It is tempting to view colorblind constitutionalism through the lens of 
contemporary politics. Opposition to affirmative action has become a 
signature position of the political Right, synonymous with faith in the free 
market, emphasis on the harms created by racial classifications, and concern 
about discrimination against whites. The history of opposition to affirmative 
action shows, however, that the politics of colorblindness have been 
contested and complex. The players and terms of the anti-affirmative-action 
debate have changed considerably over time, and the form of “reactionary” 
colorblindness familiar to us from the dissents of Justices Thomas and Scalia 
developed only recently.
Viewed in historical context, the stakes of Fisher II become clearer. 
More than ever before, the Supreme Court has come to grapple with what 
race means. However, the Court’s growing awareness of the social 
construction of race has created new challenges for supporters of an 
antisubordination vision of the Constitution. Opponents of affirmative 
action have marshalled new arguments, borrowing from the claims long 
advanced by historians and CRT theorists. These activists argue that if race
is artificial, race-conscious admissions programs are unfair, arbitrary, and 
easy to manipulate.
Nevertheless, future battles over affirmative action may open up an 
unexpected opportunity. Those on opposing sides of the affirmative-action 
issue have come to an uneasy consensus that racial identities are fluid, 
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contested, and socially determined. Perhaps for the first time, in using 
regarded-as reasoning, discrimination jurisprudence will come to grips with 
what race means in modern America.
